Tricked and Trapped: Human Trafficking in the Middle East, â€Žpdf 4.1 MB

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If the employer refuses to release a migrant worker from his contract, the worker is left in a difficult predicament: either he will have to agree to compensate the employer financially in order to terminate the contract, or he will have to leave without the employer’s consent. As the owner of a garment factory in Jordan said: “To terminate the contract, the worker must give one to three months’ notice and reimburse the cost of the residency permit and visa. As most who want to leave cannot pay this amount, we let them go back.” Better Work Jordan, a partnership between the ILO and the International Finance Corporation, noted in its latest compliance report one case of an employer refusing to allow a worker to leave upon the expiration of the labour contract until a replacement was found, and two cases of factories refusing to allow workers to resign with reasonable notice. 263 Some migrant workers decide to take the risk of leaving their employers without an official release in order to work as freelancers. If a worker absconds, the employer will report him to the authorities, which in turn will issue an exit ban on the individual and impose a fine that the migrant will have to pay in order to leave the country. “We don’t have the option to leave our sponsor because it is very difficult to find another one,” explained Egyptian construction workers in Lebanon. “If you leave, you become illegal and will have problems with the authorities who will detain you.” The risks of running away are compounded by the intraregional cooperation arrangements among the GCC countries, which now ensure that a migrant worker banned from one country will also be banned from the others. An Indian electrician interviewed in Kuwait said that workers understood that running away “effectively means you will never be able to work again in Kuwait or another GCC country, and the economic opportunities are here”. Box 3.21. Impossibility of leaving Egyptians are considered the second largest community after the Indian community. Hundreds of them work under the mercy of a Kuwaiti sponsor without any guarantees that secure their rights as workers. The sponsor may, under any circumstances, lay-off the worker and throw him on the street no matter how difficult the worker’s conditions might be. In such a case, the worker only has two choices. Either to become a fugitive violating the residency laws because of his incapability to pay his residence fees to a sponsor, or to face deportation to his country, this is always an unacceptable solution for them. Akhbarelyum: “Egyptians in Kuwait: We suffer from injustice and our embassy ignores our problems”, 8 June 2012, http://www.akhbarelyum.com/12501/ [20 June 2012]. 263 Better Work: Better Work Jordan: Garment industry 4th compliance synthesis report (Geneva, ILO/IFC, 14 Nov. 2012), p. 25. 119
Retention of personal documents Lack of mobility is compounded by the fact that migrant workers are not always in possession of their identity papers and cannot easily reclaim them from their employers. Higher-skilled migrant workers are not systematically deprived of their passports, as a Nepalese community leader in the UAE admitted: “Companies will sometimes keep the passports of low-skilled workers, but never the middle and high-skilled ones.” However, for lowerskilled workers passport retention is widespread, and workers frequently have to pay to get their passports back. In the UAE, Pakistani workers at a food company said that their company kept their passports, “and if you want your passport back, you have to deposit 3,000 AED [US$817], otherwise it’s very difficult to obtain”. Afghan construction workers also stated: “Our sponsor will not give us our passports until we finish our three-year contract. If we want to take annual leave, the sponsor will ask us to put money as a deposit to guarantee that we will return to finish our contract.” Similarly, Nepalese workers at a factor in Lebanon reported that they had to pay US$900 if they wanted their passports back. Some reports mentioned improvements in giving construction workers access to their passports, but there is still a long way to go to reach the ideal situation where no worker’s passport is retained. 264 A report by the ITUC on the working conditions of migrants in Qatar and the UAE also documented the malpractice of passport retention, stating that “the employers who sponsored their arrival will often hold on to their workers’ passports or refuse to provide the authorisation needed for them to get an exit visa”. 265 Several reasons are advanced by employers to justify their keeping workers’ passports. A recent survey on Egyptian workers in Jordan explains that “employers insist on keeping the custody of their workers’ passports as soon as they arrive under the pretext that they need it to distribute the work permits”. 266 The retention of passports was seen as a problem by many official government sources interviewed, as it is against national laws. However, there was a tacit understanding that in certain cases it could be admissible. As an official from the Ministry of Social Affairs and Labour in Kuwait explained, “passport retention depends on the job. If the worker is handling money, the employer will not want the worker to have his passport.” 267 264 “Home is much sweeter for Saadiyat Island labourers”, in Seven Days in Abu Dhabi (Abu Dhabi), 20 Nov. 2012. This press article refers to some of the conclusions of the audit report of PricewaterhouseCoopers (PWC), which was appointed by the Abu Dhabi Tourism Development and Investment Company to monitor working conditions on Saadiyat Island. 265 ITUC: Hidden faces of the Gulf miracle, p. 16. 266 Tamkeen: Between a rock and a hard place, p. 58. 267 Interview with an official from the Ministry of Social Affairs and Labour, Kuwait, 25 Mar. 2012. 120
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In collaboration with TRICKED AND T
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Copyright © International Labour O
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officials, worker and employer repr
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3.3.2. Recruitment 101 3.3.3. Work
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MoJ MoL MWPS MoSAL NCCHT NCT NGO NH
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LIST OF TABLES Table 2.1. Dimension
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The realization of this research pr
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In an effort to fill gaps in unders
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There have also been cases of anima
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CHAPTER 1: FRAMING THE ISSUE 1.1. D
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People trafficked for any of the ex
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1.2. GLOBAL DEBATES ON HUMAN TRAFFI
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processes by which migrant workers
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Concerted efforts have been made to
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documented abuses against domestic
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CHAPTER 2: METHODOLOGY 2.1. RESEARC
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Table 2.1. Dimensions of forced lab
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Table 2.4. Indicators of impossibil
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2.2. OVERVIEW OF DATA COLLECTED In
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Having said that, the Middle East i
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individuals who voluntarily agree t
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3.1.2. Recruitment of domestic work
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domestic worker explained, “many
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An official from the NGO KAFA went
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Another Filipina explained the supp
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In Jordan, an official from Tamkeen
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workers supported by the NGO report
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on the balcony. When it got cold, I
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3.1.4. Impossibility of leaving Wor
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Legally, the domestic worker has li
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embassy three times to make an emer
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given that it is not easy for a mig
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Analysis of the information provide
Page 69 and 70: country, or whose relatives are dec
Page 71 and 72: 3.2.2. Recruitment Recruitment of d
Page 73 and 74: to provide sexual services. Most of
Page 75 and 76: The research team was unable to int
Page 77 and 78: Box 3.9. A press report of traffick
Page 79 and 80: explained that in 2010 there were b
Page 81 and 82: There are conflicting views over th
Page 83 and 84: one nightclub owner in Amman. 144 T
Page 85 and 86: 2011, three minors and three adult
Page 87 and 88: Many reports confirm the interlinka
Page 89 and 90: Some claim that the situation of ar
Page 91 and 92: finish working, especially Tunisian
Page 93 and 94: Investigations carried out by the I
Page 95 and 96: Detention of women accused of prost
Page 97 and 98: Lack of any economic and social alt
Page 99 and 100: 3.3. OTHER ECONOMIC ACTIVITIES 3.3.
Page 101 and 102: Table 3.3. Overview of four process
Page 103 and 104: Indeed, many of those interviewed w
Page 105 and 106: workers, often requiring them to ta
Page 107 and 108: not suitable for the position so th
Page 109 and 110: The case of seafarers Stories emerg
Page 111 and 112: personnel from the ports to offshor
Page 113 and 114: of destination often happen through
Page 115 and 116: and we will find him a new job”.
Page 117 and 118: Degrading living and working condit
Page 119: Ministerial Decree 1186 (2010) was
Page 124 and 125: CHAPTER 4: REGIONAL RESPONSES TO HU
Page 126 and 127: In Lebanon, the Government ratified
Page 128 and 129: trafficking efforts in the seven em
Page 130 and 131: stipulating that employers must giv
Page 132 and 133: In Kuwait, in the absence of a spec
Page 134 and 135: 4.1.5. Prosecution of human traffic
Page 136 and 137: Box 4.1. Ending the use of child ca
Page 138 and 139: 4.2. STRENGTHENING THE INSTITUTIONA
Page 140 and 141: order management officers at the ai
Page 142 and 143: government action has, however, bee
Page 144 and 145: Box 4.3. Ending forced labour in th
Page 146 and 147: among migrant workers and no protoc
Page 148 and 149: to the needs of their citizens. The
Page 150 and 151: Dialogue in 2008 to promote a colla
Page 152 and 153: CHAPTER 5: A WAY FORWARD Comprehens
Page 154 and 155: to legally terminate a contract aft
Page 156 and 157: 5.3.2. Taking measures to reduce vu
Page 158 and 159: attention also needs to be given to
Page 160 and 161: with new skills, which will make it
Page 162 and 163: ANNEX: LIST OF STATES PARTIES TO KE
Page 164 and 165: BIBLIOGRAPHY National legislation B
Page 166 and 167: Lebanon Labour Code, 1946. Law on E
Page 168 and 169: International Convention on the Pro
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The Economist. 2010. “Little bett
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—. 2006. Multilateral Framework o
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—. 2011b. Qatar’s ambitions for
Page 176 and 177:
—. 2010. The international legal
Page 178 and 179:
Transient Workers Count Two. 2012.
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This regional study sheds light on
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