Dissertation_Paula Aleksandrowicz_12 ... - Jacobs University

employees. During pre-retirement, the firm paid the former worker 70-85 per cent of his/her
former earnings, depending on the duration of the scheme.
The results of my analysis confirm Mares´ (2001: 58) assertion that firms strive to
preserve the locus of control in early exit policies. The interest of the firm (as represented
by the interviewed managers) is to use ATZ or pre-retirement in times of personnel
reductions but to undermine a general claim of workers to that exit option in times of
employment stability due to its high costs. To name some examples: the personnel manager
in Firm DE-14 rejected dismissals via social selection with the argument that workers
whom the firm wanted to preserve would have to leave, while others would have to be
retained. The civil service establishment suffered from personnel shortages at the time of
the second interview as too many persons went on ATZ. The chairman of the works council
supposed that this was the reason for curtailing ATZ at firm level. The same situation
occurred in the steelworks at the time of the second interview. In many firms, workers may
choose or reject ATZ but the firm dictates the terms of the contract (duration, entry and exit
age, blocked model).
Mares (2001: 196) also stated that firms with a more qualified workforce and with a
better financial standing strive to reward their former workers with an early retirement
income reflecting their former earnings. My results confirm this: Firm DE-2, Firm DE-12
and Firm DE-14, which have a highly qualified workforce, offered their older workers
more favourable conditions for early exit than Firm DE-6 or Firm DE-11, where many
workers are unqualified and therefore exchangeable and the wages are low.
Firms which did not reduce personnel at any time of my study (Firm DE-4, Firm DE-5
and Firm DE-12 49 ; Firm DE-7, Firm DE-8, Firm DE-9 and Firm DE-10 at the time of the
first interview) also offered incentives for older workers to leave earlier. E.g., the health
fund offers ATZ as a response to workers´ wishes; both the personnel manager and the
chairman of the works council confirmed that the initiative to retire earlier is always taken
by the worker. The employer tries to make the instrument attractive with the help of a
compensation for pension deductions, or additional subsidies in the case of impaired
workers (2_Firm DE-4_HRM). Another vehicle of early exit is the one-year leave at the age
of 59 with almost full wages. The transportation equipment company utilised ATZ as a
49 Two of those firms were studied only in 2004; in 2006, Firm DE-5 started mass redundancies.
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