Dissertation_Paula Aleksandrowicz_12 ... - Jacobs University

The higher employers´ organisation density and collective bargaining coverage in
Germany is, on the one hand, a chance for concerted policy at branch level, which quite
recently has brought about collective agreements on demographic change in the German
steel industry and chemical industry. The lower degree of bargaining centralisation in
Poland (20% as comp. to 47% in Germany; EIRO data), and the low frequency of
bargaining within the Tripartite Commission (Socha/Sztanderska 2000: 184) leaves the
establishment level as the main arena for bargaining on personnel policy issues (and,
potentially, also on age management issues). That may, on the one hand, stabilise
employment as it protects employers from overt demands of trade unions (ibid: 39). On the
other hand, it diminishes the innovative potential of collective agreements in the field of age
management (see section 3.2.4.), as with a smaller degree of bargaining centralisation, it is
easier to push through regulations for whole branches instead of bargaining separately with
each employer. And as the experience of other EU countries has shown, strong social
partners have supported or initiated innovative legislative projects e.g. in the field of work
ability and further training (Hartlapp/Schmid 2006: 170-4). By standard-setting, social
partners in a coordinated market economy like Germany also encourage the transferability
of skills within an industry (Hall/Soskice 2001: 25ff). Therefore, the results on that variable
are equivocal.
The same conclusion applies to industrial relations at company level. Here, the higher
workplace representation coverage in Germany (53% of workers when comp. to 22% in
Poland; EIRO data) and the institution of co-determination account for the greater ability of
employee representatives in German firms to protect workers and to voice integrative
demands regarding e.g. further training. Works councils in German firms increase
employment stability, foster retraining and are organisationally efficient in a way that they
balance out employer´s and employees´ interests (Backes-Gellner et al. 1997: 328, 338;
Hall/Soskice 2001: 25). But, on the other hand, employee representatives may voice greater
demands for preserving the status quo e.g. on early exit (Orenstein 2000). The insideroutsider
theory brings forward their negative effect on increasing the employment of
marginal groups of the labour market (Lindbeck/Snower 1988: 243ff).
Another positive impact factor is EU influence on legislation in Poland and Germany.
Both Poland and Germany are EU members, but due to different length of membership and
more advanced convergence in Germany, the influence of EU regulations on legislation
(and, via that channel, on company policy) is higher in the latter case. The country
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