Dissertation_Paula Aleksandrowicz_12 ... - Jacobs University

3. Institutional and Socio-economic Framework of Early
Exit
3.1. Country Models
In chapter 2., I depicted two analytical models. One was centred on the firm level (Fig.
1), the other on the individual worker (Fig. 2). Both are located within the framework of
actor-centred institutionalism and depict the process of decision-making with regard to late
or early exit from the labour market.
In this section, I want to complement my analysis with an institutional model (Fig. 3). It
depicts the way the policy of state actors and the institutional context are translated into firm
policies and ultimately result in employment rates and the average retirement age at
aggregated national level.
The analytical model is based on the actor-centred institutionalism of Mayntz and
Scharpf (1995). That approach advocates a multi-level observation. In my case, I analyse the
effect of institutional regulations (macro level) on firms´ personnel policy towards older
workers (micro level). The institutional framework constitutes opportunities and restrictions
for the action of corporate actors, social partners and individual workers. In turn, the
institutional framework is itself influenced by the interaction between firms, social partners
and state actors. I however assume that social partners and firms do not have direct
influence on institution-forming but exert that kind of influence indirectly, via interrelation
with state actors.
The actor composition is different in the case of Poland and Germany. In Germany,
works councils negotiate with management the shape of personnel policy by power of the
institution of co-determination. Collective agreements set up by external bargaining parties
(employers´ associations and trade unions) set minimum standards in that respect. In Poland,
branch-level agreements are relatively seldom; therefore the main arena of negotiations
takes places within the firm. Here, often several trade unions compete for power and bargain
with the management.
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