Dissertation_Paula Aleksandrowicz_12 ... - Jacobs University
Dissertation_Paula Aleksandrowicz_12 ... - Jacobs University
Dissertation_Paula Aleksandrowicz_12 ... - Jacobs University
Create successful ePaper yourself
Turn your PDF publications into a flip-book with our unique Google optimized e-Paper software.
external structural determinants which necessitate the firm to reduce personnel, resp. by a<br />
stable employment situation.<br />
The decision to stay is in most parts shaped by the calculation to maintain the current<br />
standard of living (and thus indirectly by pension reforms) and by high job satisfaction, and<br />
is taken more often by men than by women. The firm experts also observed that risen job<br />
intensity and faster pace of changes diminish job satisfaction, which is then translated into<br />
early exit. Also the inconsistent movements of the legislator and partially backing off from<br />
unpopular reform elements moves retirees-to-be to grasp the still existing early exit options.<br />
Works councils play in the process of individual decision-making a role as agitators for<br />
early exit. Depending on their relations with the management, they do it either with the<br />
intention to do older workers something good (e.g. by conducting calculations what they<br />
gain and what they use by choosing either the option of early exit or prolonged<br />
employment), or in order to smooth the process of personnel reductions. In the latter case,<br />
the works council agitates in favour of early exit either from the position of co-manager, the<br />
representative of interests of (younger) workers without pension entitlements, or, lastly, as a<br />
sub-ordinate “organ of the management” (Kotthoff 1995: 550).<br />
The qualitative panel proved useful with regard to tracking the change of retirement<br />
preferences over time, as by the time of the first interview, neither firms nor interviewees<br />
have had fully realised the impact of pension reforms.<br />
4.2.8. Impact of Legislative Changes<br />
In this chapter, I will assess whether firms in my sample have responded to institutional<br />
changes within the framework of pension policy and passive and active labour market<br />
policy. On that basis, I will test hypothesis 1 and hypothesis 6. The reform elements<br />
concerned will be any changed rules of participation in the early retirement scheme, the 59<br />
rule, disability pensions, social selection in case of mass lay-offs, retirement ages, antidiscrimination<br />
rulings and incentives to hire or to qualify an older worker (see overview in<br />
Table 1 in chapter 2. and in section 3.2.). Such reforms were taken into consideration which<br />
had come into effect before the first or the second interview.<br />
The relevant dimensions for the analysis are defined with regard to the goal of<br />
prolongation of working life which can be reached by the recruitment of older workers and<br />
by their retention, and which I assume to be the intention of the legislator when passing the<br />
reform. Thus, on the one side of the continuum would be internalisation of older workers,<br />
145