Dissertation_Paula Aleksandrowicz_12 ... - Jacobs University

unions. This will allow the management to play one trade union off against another but
it will be more difficult to reach a collusion of interests.
Ebbinghaus observed a “collusion” of interests between employer representatives and
the management with regard to early exit in Western European countries and that both
parties pursued the goal of externalising the costs of early exit onto the public (ibid: 48).
Both in Germany in Poland, the early exit trend has been built up and sustained through
cooperation between the state and the collective bargaining parties.
But while the works councils in Germany often assume the role of “co-managers”
(Schmidt/Trinczek 1999: 117), the model of workers´ interest representation at shop level in
Poland resembles the French system of plural unionism. This model, “making for interunion
conflict, dissipates labour´s strength vis-á-vis employers” and enables employers to
“manipulate the system and deal with whatever body appears most amenable to
negotiation” (Lane 1989: 212-3). In contrast, in Germany, the principle of one union per
branch is in place which reduces conflicts within works councils which are composed
mostly of union members.
Nienhüser (1998) states that an unrivalled works council (or shop-level trade union
committee, in the case of Poland) will be more cooperative and prone to compromise than a
works council which has to compete for its position. In the latter case, the employee
representatives will strive to demand benefits to the workers from the employer, and the
relations will be more conflict-prone. That entails that in Poland, where several trade unions
rival for re-elections and for recognition by the employer as a bargaining party, it will be
more difficult for the management to reach an agreement on age management and early
retirement. But the management will be able to push through its interest, e.g. by not
responding to trade unions´ demands for a higher compensation in case of redundancies.
The power of the employer will be lower in the stronger ´juridificated´ Germany in areas
which are regulated in collective agreements.
Operationalisation: I will analyse the politics and policy of employee representatives at
firm-level in realms of early exit and process of bargaining with the management on these
matters. I will base my analysis on oral accounts of the personnel managers and the
employee representatives as well as on collective bargaining material (collective and works
council agreements, social plans and personnel communication on those matters, wherever
available).
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