Dissertation_Paula Aleksandrowicz_12 ... - Jacobs University

with the receipt of the unemployment benefit. The rationale for the use of pre-retirement
benefits as an instrument of labour shedding in 2003/2004 was, both for the firm and the
workers, the approaching worse conditions for the receipt of those benefits. The trade
unions had signed an agreement with the employer to allow the workers to make use of the
expiring option:
“Although de facto, I say, those people could have easily worked longer, that was choosing the
lesser evil. That means, the law [on pre-retirement benefits] helped the people to make a quick
decision, because if they would be released today, they would not be entitled to that any more.
Therefore… I do not call that mass lay-offs. That was a choice of the lesser evil.” (Firm PL-13_TU)
That example shows the collusion of interests of employees, the employer and trade
unions on the issue of early retirement, and the impact of institutional incentives. The
workers in that and other Polish firms agreed to exit early, but their decision was not
completely voluntary. They knew about the unstable employment prospects in the firm and
exited early for fear of unemployment should the legislator decide to discontinue preretirement
benefits altogether. This points to an adaptive, endogenous shaping of exit
preferences (Elster 1983: 110ff).
In sum, it can be said that the situation of constant downsizing is typical of Poland as a
country with a transforming economy (Mroczkowski et al. 2005). Older workers are treated
as a flexibility resource during personnel reductions or ´natural turnover´, although several
firms which understand themselves as “social” attach importance to the protection of older
workers and of those incapable of work from unemployment and low pension levels, and
are willing to retain older workers who have decided not to utilise pre-retirement benefits.
Natural turnover is also used as a means of seasonal personnel adjustments if there is no
need for large-scale downsizing.
Older workers in Poland are less protected from dismissal than in Germany, as dismissal
protection is rarely codified in collective agreements (in my sample, there were three such
cases). The 4-year protection period is circumvented by Polish firms by releasing older
workers earlier, or by signing a cancellation agreement which is not always voluntary. The
employer has more power in deciding on the conditions of early exit, the trade unions have
reduced leeway (with the exception of industries ´with high importance for the national
economy´, like energy industry, the railways, heavy industry), which is typical of privatised
enterprises (Siewierski 1993: 146). That makes the prolongation of working life seem less
likely in Poland than in Germany. However, an opportunity for prolongation of working life
is the absence of the formulation in work contracts that employment ends upon reaching
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