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Dissertation_Paula Aleksandrowicz_12 ... - Jacobs University

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only limited impact (and interest) to co-decide on recruitment issues, they are a powerful<br />

partner on issues of health management and contract termination.<br />

In the field of further training, know-how transfer and health management, clashes<br />

between the two parties centre on cost containment issues. With regard to early retirement<br />

and personnel reductions, there is less disagreement, and a collusion of interests can be<br />

observed. Both the management and employee representatives are interested in preventing<br />

dismissals due to operational reasons. The works councils play an active role in searching<br />

for alternatives and focusing personnel reductions on older workers. Beside the aim of<br />

preventing dismissals, the interest of the works council in early retirement is motivated by<br />

the wish to release older workers from adverse working conditions with a financial<br />

compensation.<br />

It has however to be added that such collusive behaviour is possible only under the<br />

condition of the continued interest of workers in early exit. In the interviews with firm<br />

experts, I learnt that the wishes of older workers to get relief from work burdens while at<br />

the same time receiving a wage compensation which allowed status maintenance played a<br />

huge role for the forming of opinions of works councils on early exit.<br />

4.2.10. Conclusions<br />

In this chapter, I will repeat the results of hypothesis testing given in the previous subsections.<br />

Afterwards, I will conduct a typological analysis of the 14 firms in the sample<br />

based on evidence presented so far.<br />

Hypothesis 1 (see section 2.1.) is supported with restrictions. It is supported with<br />

regard to pension reforms, but not supported with regard to active labour market policies.<br />

Possibly, positive incentives for the internalisation of older workers entailed by labour<br />

market reforms incite action to a lower extent than do sanctions (see Table 1 in chapter 2.).<br />

I however claim that structural conditions (above all, the situation on the labour market)<br />

determine firm-level policy and the degree of adaptation to institutional changes in the first<br />

place.<br />

Of the two competing hypotheses 2A and 2B (see section 2.2.), hypothesis 2A is<br />

supported with regard to recruitment, as older workers are seldom hired. Firms set a certain<br />

age threshold above which applicants are regarded as less able. Hypothesis 2A is also<br />

supported with regard to the termination of the work contract – older workers are treated as<br />

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