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CP13/6 - CRD IV for Investment Firms - Financial Conduct Authority

CP13/6 - CRD IV for Investment Firms - Financial Conduct Authority

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FCA 2013/xx<br />

commensurate risk transfer has been achieved the FCA will generally expect<br />

a firm to obtain a public rating on retained tranches and apply the ratingsbased<br />

method (RBM) instead of the SFM. For synthetic securitisations this<br />

might require a firm to create an instrument relating to the retained tranche in<br />

order to obtain a rating on the tranche. However, a firm should be aware that<br />

the use of RBM might not be sufficient to meet the significant risk transfer<br />

test if, notwithstanding the higher RWEA that would apply to the retained<br />

position, there is not a significant transfer of risk <strong>for</strong> the overall transaction. A<br />

firm should ensure it has regard to articles 268 and 269 of the EU CRR (Use<br />

of credit assessment by ECAIs) when obtaining public ratings on retained<br />

positions.<br />

4.4.26 G A firm may still be able to demonstrate significant risk transfer without a<br />

rating but the FCA believes that this is likely to be exceptional and a firm is<br />

expected to submit any proposal to do so to the FCA be<strong>for</strong>e claiming any<br />

capital relief. Two examples of ‘exceptional’ cases are where it is not<br />

possible to obtain a rating from an eligible ECAI or where the small size of a<br />

transaction makes the cost of obtaining a rating disproportionate. In each case<br />

the firm must provide the FCA with sufficient evidence of such<br />

‘exceptionality’. In the first example, the FCA expects this to include written<br />

confirmation that no eligible ECAIs were prepared to rate the transaction. In<br />

the second example, the FCA expects a firm to provide an analysis of the<br />

costs of obtaining a rating relative to the potential capital reduction available<br />

from the transaction. The FCA does not expect a firm to seek to exploit the<br />

boundary of what might constitute ‘exceptional’ cases (eg, by deliberately<br />

structuring many small transactions rather than a single larger transaction).<br />

4.4.27 G A firm with IRB permission that invest in unrated securitisation positions in<br />

the trading book or non-trading book are not required to obtain external<br />

ratings on such positions. However, use of SFM by investors in the trading<br />

book or non-trading book requires prior permission from the FCA, and it will<br />

consider the nature of positions <strong>for</strong> which use of SFM is being sought as part<br />

of its approval decision-making process.<br />

High cost credit protection and other significant risk transfer considerations<br />

4.4.28 G Any reduction in own funds requirements achieved through securitisation<br />

should be matched with a commensurate transfer of risk to third parties.<br />

Articles 243 (Traditional securitisation) and 244 (Synthetic securitisation) of<br />

the EU CRR set out that if the FCA decides that the possible reduction in riskweighted<br />

exposure amounts which would be achieved through securitisation<br />

is not matched by such commensurate transfer of risk, it will determine that<br />

significant risk transfer has not been achieved by this transaction.<br />

4.4.29 G This substance-over-<strong>for</strong>m principle also applies to the assessment of the<br />

minimum requirements contained in articles 243(5) and 244(5) of the EU<br />

CRR. In particular, the instruments used to transfer credit risk must not<br />

contain any terms or conditions which materially limit the amount of risk<br />

transferred. For example, where losses or defaults occur in the pool (ie,<br />

deterioration in the credit quality of the underlying pool) the originator’s net<br />

cost of protection or the yield payable to investors should not increase. Legal<br />

counsel's opinion (as required under articles 243(5)(b) and 244(5)(d) of the<br />

Page 97 of 197

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