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tectionism will cause a temporary decline in were affected by NTBs; for manufactured exports,<br />

income. This could lead to a deterioration in the the ratio was 18 percent. The persistent protectioncurrent<br />

account balance, as consumers will cut ism of the main industrial countries has produced<br />

expenditure less than one for one with a tempo- surpluses that are often dumped on world marrary<br />

fall in income.<br />

kets. This inhibits domestic production in developing<br />

countries, even though it would often be more<br />

The new protectionism<br />

efficient than production in the industrial countries.<br />

The tariffs and NTBs used to protect sugar<br />

Tariff reductions undertaken since <strong>World</strong> War II growers in industrial countries inflict income<br />

were continued in the Tokyo Round negotiations, losses on developing-country sugar exporters<br />

which lowered tariffs to levels not seen before in equal to nearly 10 percent of all the aid from industhis<br />

century. But while the reductions have been trial countries to all developing countries. The loss<br />

extended to the developing countries under the of export revenues is estimated to be almost 30<br />

Most Favored Nation clause, tariffs have been low- percent of the total aid bill (see Box 3.4).<br />

ered less than the average on products of interest * Steel. The volume of steel imported into the<br />

to developing countries. Moreover, the fact that United States fell 3.3 percent a year in 1971-73<br />

tariffs rise as raw materials go through progressive when quotas were imposed. It then grew at an<br />

stages of processing means that the trading system annual rate of 8.3 percent in the mid-1970s after<br />

discourages processing industries in the develop- quotas were removed. But when the trigger price<br />

ing countries.<br />

mechanism was introduced in 1977 it slowed down<br />

A more serious danger to developing countries' to 2.6 percent a year.<br />

exports is the growing use of nontariff barriers * Footwear. Korean exports of footwear to the<br />

(NTBs). On one measure-the proportion of United Kingdom increased by 57.5 percent a year<br />

imports subject to restriction-the extent of NTBs in real terms in 1973-79 but fell 19.1 percent a year<br />

more than doubled in the United States between in 1979 and 1980 after nontariff barriers were<br />

1980 and 1983 and increased by 38 percent in the imposed.<br />

EC. A much larger share of industrial-country NTBs do much more damage to the competitive<br />

imports from developing countries is subject to structure of a market than tariffs. Once the quotas<br />

NTBs than imports from other industrial countries have been fulfilled, marginal foreign competitors<br />

(see Table 3.3). Such ratios do not reflect tightening are excluded from the market-thereby increasing<br />

of existing NTBs and may therefore underestimate the monopoly power of domestic firms. Tariffs do<br />

their increased use. One example is the progres- not remove marginal foreign competitors but simsive<br />

tightening of the Multifibre Arrangement each ply give them a cost disadvantage. From the<br />

time it is renegotiated. exporter's point of view, voluntary export<br />

Commodity by commodity, NTBs do consider- restraints (VERs) are preferable to quotas adminisable<br />

harm:<br />

tered by importers; with VERs, exporters can at<br />

a Agriculture. Although much attention is paid least sell their products at market prices prevailing<br />

to the trade barriers erected against the manufac- in the importing country rather than at the lower<br />

tured exports of developing countries, in fact they world price. However, the long-term damage of<br />

are less prevalent than those against agricultural VERs is likely to be higher than that caused by<br />

exports. In 1983, 29 percent of developing coun- quotas administered by importers: they lock in the<br />

tries' agricultural exports to industrial countries existing set of suppliers and keep out any lowercost<br />

competitors that may emerge. Taking the<br />

Table 3.3 Share of imports subject to nontariff Multifibre Arrangement on textiles as an example<br />

barriers in industrial-country markets, 1983<br />

of a VER, Korea or Hong Kong may not lose too<br />

Percentage of imports from: much-but newcomers like China or Sri Lanka cer-<br />

Industrial All developing Major<br />

Market countries countries borrowers<br />

tainly do.<br />

Even more damaging than the direct costs of<br />

EC 10.2 21.8 24.9 trade restrictions could be the signal they send to<br />

Japan 9.3 10.5 9.6 developing countries about the merits of export-<br />

United States 7.7 12.9 14.5<br />

All industrial countries 10.5 19.8 21.9<br />

oriented policies. Further proliferation of NTBs<br />

could very well revive (and justify) the export pes-<br />

Note: Data are based on 1981 weighted averages for all world trade in simism that prevailed in many developing counall<br />

products except fuels.<br />

Source: <strong>World</strong> <strong>Bank</strong> data.<br />

tries in the 1930s and 1940s. Yet the empirical evi-<br />

40

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