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tectionism will cause a temporary decline in were affected by NTBs; for manufactured exports,<br />
income. This could lead to a deterioration in the the ratio was 18 percent. The persistent protectioncurrent<br />
account balance, as consumers will cut ism of the main industrial countries has produced<br />
expenditure less than one for one with a tempo- surpluses that are often dumped on world marrary<br />
fall in income.<br />
kets. This inhibits domestic production in developing<br />
countries, even though it would often be more<br />
The new protectionism<br />
efficient than production in the industrial countries.<br />
The tariffs and NTBs used to protect sugar<br />
Tariff reductions undertaken since <strong>World</strong> War II growers in industrial countries inflict income<br />
were continued in the Tokyo Round negotiations, losses on developing-country sugar exporters<br />
which lowered tariffs to levels not seen before in equal to nearly 10 percent of all the aid from industhis<br />
century. But while the reductions have been trial countries to all developing countries. The loss<br />
extended to the developing countries under the of export revenues is estimated to be almost 30<br />
Most Favored Nation clause, tariffs have been low- percent of the total aid bill (see Box 3.4).<br />
ered less than the average on products of interest * Steel. The volume of steel imported into the<br />
to developing countries. Moreover, the fact that United States fell 3.3 percent a year in 1971-73<br />
tariffs rise as raw materials go through progressive when quotas were imposed. It then grew at an<br />
stages of processing means that the trading system annual rate of 8.3 percent in the mid-1970s after<br />
discourages processing industries in the develop- quotas were removed. But when the trigger price<br />
ing countries.<br />
mechanism was introduced in 1977 it slowed down<br />
A more serious danger to developing countries' to 2.6 percent a year.<br />
exports is the growing use of nontariff barriers * Footwear. Korean exports of footwear to the<br />
(NTBs). On one measure-the proportion of United Kingdom increased by 57.5 percent a year<br />
imports subject to restriction-the extent of NTBs in real terms in 1973-79 but fell 19.1 percent a year<br />
more than doubled in the United States between in 1979 and 1980 after nontariff barriers were<br />
1980 and 1983 and increased by 38 percent in the imposed.<br />
EC. A much larger share of industrial-country NTBs do much more damage to the competitive<br />
imports from developing countries is subject to structure of a market than tariffs. Once the quotas<br />
NTBs than imports from other industrial countries have been fulfilled, marginal foreign competitors<br />
(see Table 3.3). Such ratios do not reflect tightening are excluded from the market-thereby increasing<br />
of existing NTBs and may therefore underestimate the monopoly power of domestic firms. Tariffs do<br />
their increased use. One example is the progres- not remove marginal foreign competitors but simsive<br />
tightening of the Multifibre Arrangement each ply give them a cost disadvantage. From the<br />
time it is renegotiated. exporter's point of view, voluntary export<br />
Commodity by commodity, NTBs do consider- restraints (VERs) are preferable to quotas adminisable<br />
harm:<br />
tered by importers; with VERs, exporters can at<br />
a Agriculture. Although much attention is paid least sell their products at market prices prevailing<br />
to the trade barriers erected against the manufac- in the importing country rather than at the lower<br />
tured exports of developing countries, in fact they world price. However, the long-term damage of<br />
are less prevalent than those against agricultural VERs is likely to be higher than that caused by<br />
exports. In 1983, 29 percent of developing coun- quotas administered by importers: they lock in the<br />
tries' agricultural exports to industrial countries existing set of suppliers and keep out any lowercost<br />
competitors that may emerge. Taking the<br />
Table 3.3 Share of imports subject to nontariff Multifibre Arrangement on textiles as an example<br />
barriers in industrial-country markets, 1983<br />
of a VER, Korea or Hong Kong may not lose too<br />
Percentage of imports from: much-but newcomers like China or Sri Lanka cer-<br />
Industrial All developing Major<br />
Market countries countries borrowers<br />
tainly do.<br />
Even more damaging than the direct costs of<br />
EC 10.2 21.8 24.9 trade restrictions could be the signal they send to<br />
Japan 9.3 10.5 9.6 developing countries about the merits of export-<br />
United States 7.7 12.9 14.5<br />
All industrial countries 10.5 19.8 21.9<br />
oriented policies. Further proliferation of NTBs<br />
could very well revive (and justify) the export pes-<br />
Note: Data are based on 1981 weighted averages for all world trade in simism that prevailed in many developing counall<br />
products except fuels.<br />
Source: <strong>World</strong> <strong>Bank</strong> data.<br />
tries in the 1930s and 1940s. Yet the empirical evi-<br />
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