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Box 4.1<br />

(continued)<br />

trade deficits. In the 1980s, many of these same countries<br />

have been moved to the third, or early creditor, stage,<br />

reducing net debt by running huge trade surpluses. This<br />

development is, of course, the mirror image of what has<br />

occurred in some industrial countries. For example, in<br />

terms of the debt cycle hypothesis, the United States<br />

recently reentered the early debtor stage of the debt<br />

cycle, incurring debt at an accelerating rate while increas-<br />

ing its trade deficits. The reasons for these shifts are<br />

complex and are explored in the Report.<br />

teenth year, growth rates of exports and GDP, as well as<br />

the debt ratios, settle down to their long-run sustainable<br />

levels. Export growth has risen to 6 percent, which is<br />

sufficient to sustain continued current account deficits<br />

and steadily growing debt.<br />

Sudden shifts in major economic variables, as have<br />

occurred with particular force in the past decade, often<br />

lead to major departures from the predicted path. During<br />

the latter half of the 1970s, many developing countries<br />

thought to be mature debtors reverted to the early<br />

debtor stage, importing capital and running mounting<br />

Box table 4.1A Sustainable growth of debt: a hypothetical case<br />

(average annual percent, unless otherwise noted)<br />

1st to 6th to l1th to 16th to 2Ist to<br />

Variable 5th years 10th years 15th years 20th years 30th years<br />

Interest rate 3.75 3.75 3.75 3.75 3.75<br />

Growth of<br />

exports 3.0 3.0 14.1 6.0 6.0<br />

Growth of GDP 6.2 7.4 6.4 6.0 6.0<br />

Current account<br />

deficit/GDP 2.1 6.4 3.9 2.4 2.4<br />

Debt service/<br />

exports 2.1 17.5 32.0 31.0 31.0<br />

DebtlGDP 4.6 24.0 42.0 42.0 42.0<br />

Debt at end of<br />

period (millions<br />

of dollars) 16.5 103.0 210.0 280.0 530.0<br />

Note: Calculations are based on a simulation model that makes the following assumptions: incremental capital output ratio 3.5; consumption = 80<br />

percent of GDP; import elasticity = 1.0; Maturity of debt = 12 years. Growth rates and interest rates are expressed in real terms.<br />

period, some countries that borrowed heavily ing, investment, and growth highlights the impergrew<br />

slowly or not at all. In some instances-such ative of using all capital efficiently. Public sector<br />

as Peru and Zambia-slow growth was associated investments require careful appraisal, taking reawith<br />

stagnant investment ratios; foreign capital sonable precautions for downside risks. Private<br />

was being used to cover balance of payments defi- sector projects need a framework of incentivescits<br />

caused by unsustainable macroeconomic poli- rewards and penalties-which encourage efficient<br />

cies and falling commodity prices. In other coun- investment. Failure in these two areas has been a<br />

tries-mainly in Africa-substantial capital inflows primary cause of slow growth in some countries in<br />

helped to raise investment rates, but the invest- the past decade (see Box 4.3).<br />

ments themselves were often inefficient. Nonethe- Where foreign capital is involved, countries can<br />

less, countries such as India (see Box 4.2), Indone- run into a "transformation problem"-that is, the<br />

sia, and Korea achieved moderate or even very projects fail to generate (or save) enough foreign<br />

high growth rates without raising their borrowing exchange to service the foreign debt. This can haprates.<br />

Finally, in 1979-83, the relationship between pen for several reasons. Project gestation periods<br />

changes in debt to GDP and growth of GDP was may be mismatched with the maturity profile of<br />

negative. In an environment of rising real interest the loans-an issue of portfolio management that<br />

rates and contracting world economic output, will be discussed in the next chapter. Alternatively,<br />

increased borrowing no longer translated into certain projects may never be able to generate or<br />

higher growth. Again, however, the experience is save sufficient foreign exchange over any time<br />

not uniform for all countries. Malaysia, for exam- period. That would not matter in an economy<br />

ple, borrowed heavily, but also achieved impres- undistorted by overvalued exchange rates, high<br />

sive growth.<br />

protection, and consumption and investment sub-<br />

The range of country experiences with borrow- sidies. Whether investments produced traded<br />

48

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