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98 Deleveraging, What Deleveraging<br />
already. Wage inflation in Shenzhen and other cities has been running at 20%<br />
per year since 2009, which reduces the profits of companies such as Foxconn,<br />
Nike and others. Worldwide food prices, such as soya beans and pork meat, are<br />
rising, which hurts countries like Argentina. The hukou system can be solved<br />
but the cost to China’s government will be roughly $1.3 trillion. Who is going<br />
to pay for it – the central or local governments Until that problem is solved,<br />
China’s growth rate will be 6-7%. It is not easy to move 400 million workers from<br />
agriculture into more productive industries.<br />
Yi Huang observed that the big jump in the Chinese debt-to-GDP ratio since<br />
2008 came mainly from the $4 trillion stimulus package. It took the form of a<br />
credit expansion directed at stable and local government investment vehicles.<br />
This huge amount of liquidity, which encouraged the buying of land, ended up in<br />
domestic banks deposits and, through Hong Kong, in US dollars. Investors then<br />
borrowed these US dollars and, in doing so, they bet on a depreciation and on<br />
profits from financial intermediation, which is dangerous. This round-trip process<br />
is related to financial repression in China and to the way credit is allocated in<br />
the domestic economy. This lack of financial development, rather than too much<br />
debt, is the reason why the Chinese authorities are now proceeding to financial<br />
market liberalisation. To deal with the hukou problem, China is abolishing its<br />
one child policy as a way of increasing labour supply and is reforming its system<br />
of land property rights.<br />
The authors then reacted to these comments. Lucrezia Reichlin first responded<br />
to Angel Ubide about the shock to asset prices. The point is that this is not just<br />
about potential income but also about asset price volatility. This is important when<br />
comparing the US and Eurozone policies. In the US, the sustained quantitative<br />
easing policy, combined with easier fiscal policy, made the deleveraging process<br />
less painful. Reichlin also accepted the point by José Luis Malo de Molina that<br />
sequencing is good in principle but very difficult in practice, especially as there is<br />
still no fiscal policy tool in the Eurozone. Even if a Eurozone fiscal policy tool did<br />
exist, the question of what would be a credible fiscal framework remains open.<br />
Regarding the issue of dealing with the banks at a very early stage, she disagreed<br />
with Fabio Panetta. The first phase of the crisis in the Eurozone was mainly an<br />
interbank market story – the interbank market dried out because of counterparty<br />
risk. Dealing with banks at an early stage has the advantage of dealing with<br />
counterparty risk, establishes clarity and distinguishes between the good and the<br />
bad part of the banking system. For a long time, the ECB was providing liquidity<br />
to everybody without knowing what was on the balance sheet of each bank. It is<br />
only now that we are dealing with that.<br />
The banking system has become very fragmented geographically because we<br />
have not been able to deal with sovereign risk and bank risk. No matter what the<br />
size of the ECB’s balance sheet is, the transmission mechanism does not work<br />
because interest rates in Spain, for example, are much higher than in Germany.<br />
Even though some progress has now been made with the banking union and<br />
other aspects, the Eurozone faces the more traditional issue of low inflation. The<br />
tools used by the Fed ought to be recognised.