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Policy issues 77<br />

Another important tool for crisis prevention is credible debt restructuring<br />

mechanisms. The existence of such mechanisms is in itself a powerful deterrent<br />

to the accumulation of excessive debt, given that it makes investors and debtors<br />

more clearly exposed to the consequences of default, thereby mitigating moral<br />

hazard problems.<br />

While robust debt restructuring mechanisms should reduce the frequency<br />

and scale of bailouts, it remains the case that limited and conditional bailouts<br />

may sometimes remain the least worst policy option during a crisis (Tirole,<br />

2012). In particular, systemic risk factors and the fear of contagion can prompt<br />

a government to bail out individual banks or even non-bank debtors. Similarly,<br />

at the international level, sovereigns may receive official funding from the<br />

international system in order to avoid the disruptions associated with nonorderly<br />

defaults.<br />

(ii) Managing deleveraging and debt crises<br />

An important element in the dynamics of the leverage cycle is a slowness to<br />

recognise that income prospects deteriorated. If debt capacity is set back, either<br />

with a reduction that falls below the current level of debt or one constraining<br />

future debt accumulation (a lower target), then there is scope for policy to offset<br />

some of the adverse consequences for economic activity.<br />

As shown in the schematic below, there are three stages in the process of<br />

coping with the leverage cycle. The first is the recognition that debt capacity<br />

has declined. The same calculation of the net present value of future output<br />

that matters for determining debt capacity also comes into play for calculating<br />

the market value of assets, such as equities and homes. As a consequence,<br />

simultaneously with the recognition that borrowing capacity has fallen, there<br />

will be a wealth loss as those capital values are written down. When those assets<br />

serve as collateral, there are additional hits to credit intermediation. The prospect<br />

for repayment diminishes with the declines in debt capacity and the value of the<br />

collateral securing those loans.<br />

Figure 5.1<br />

Stages of the leverage cycle<br />

Recognition<br />

of the loss<br />

Allocation<br />

of the loss<br />

Offset of the loss<br />

through other policies<br />

Policymakers can facilitate the recognition of these losses in their role as<br />

prudential supervisors. This is where stress tests of financial intermediaries enter<br />

as a means for the joint acknowledgement of asset impairment. In that regard, the<br />

initial asset and liability review in the US provides a model of the strict grading<br />

of a test with an option to fill the hole with government resources. In the event,<br />

because the aggregate deficiency was below the resources available through the<br />

Troubled Asset Recovery Program, the private sector provided the funding given

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