1qGLG9p
1qGLG9p
1qGLG9p
Create successful ePaper yourself
Turn your PDF publications into a flip-book with our unique Google optimized e-Paper software.
70 Deleveraging, What Deleveraging<br />
As a consequence, China is facing a poisonous combination of high, fastgrowing<br />
leverage and slowing nominal GDP (Figure 4.27). This, in turn, suggests<br />
growing difficulties in servicing and repaying debt in a number of sectors in the<br />
future are likely. These difficulties might be exacerbated by the fact that market<br />
rates are likely to increase as a consequence of ongoing financial reforms.<br />
Figure 4.27 Chinese leverage and underlying nominal GDP growth<br />
17.0<br />
16.0<br />
China: Nominal growth (HP filter)<br />
China: Total debt/GDP (rhs)<br />
220<br />
210<br />
15.0<br />
200<br />
14.0<br />
190<br />
13.0<br />
180<br />
12.0<br />
170<br />
11.0<br />
160<br />
10.0<br />
150<br />
9.0<br />
05 06 07 08 09 10 11 12 13<br />
Source: Authors’ calculations based on national account data.<br />
140<br />
In addition to these patterns, the debt situation in China is made even more<br />
fragile by two further considerations. First, the recent increase in debt was raised<br />
especially by relatively weak borrowers, such as local governments with fragile<br />
income streams and, in particular, companies active in construction and other<br />
sectors (e.g. the steel producing industry) plagued by overcapacity (the driver<br />
of private debt in Figure 4.26). Second, credit was granted by relatively weak<br />
lenders, as shown by the sharp increase of the weight of shadow banking (trust<br />
funds, etc.) within total lending (Figure 4.28).<br />
These factors help to explain the Chinese effort for structural reforms aiming<br />
at supporting potential growth and breaking the formation of a vicious spiral<br />
between leverage and growth. The success of this effort will be crucial to the<br />
future of China. However, it is legitimate to be sceptical about the potential<br />
of reforms to boost short-term growth, even reforms that are successful in the<br />
medium term.<br />
In China, as elsewhere, it is hard to identify in advance the leverage breaking<br />
point beyond which a crisis enfolds. It is less hard, however, to interpret the current<br />
debt dynamics of debt as unsustainable. Most likely, the Chinese government is<br />
aware of the adverse dynamics that we have described and is willing to start a<br />
process of deleveraging. At least initially, this process should be in the form of a<br />
moderation in the pace of the leveraging up of the economy. However, there will