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70 Deleveraging, What Deleveraging<br />

As a consequence, China is facing a poisonous combination of high, fastgrowing<br />

leverage and slowing nominal GDP (Figure 4.27). This, in turn, suggests<br />

growing difficulties in servicing and repaying debt in a number of sectors in the<br />

future are likely. These difficulties might be exacerbated by the fact that market<br />

rates are likely to increase as a consequence of ongoing financial reforms.<br />

Figure 4.27 Chinese leverage and underlying nominal GDP growth<br />

17.0<br />

16.0<br />

China: Nominal growth (HP filter)<br />

China: Total debt/GDP (rhs)<br />

220<br />

210<br />

15.0<br />

200<br />

14.0<br />

190<br />

13.0<br />

180<br />

12.0<br />

170<br />

11.0<br />

160<br />

10.0<br />

150<br />

9.0<br />

05 06 07 08 09 10 11 12 13<br />

Source: Authors’ calculations based on national account data.<br />

140<br />

In addition to these patterns, the debt situation in China is made even more<br />

fragile by two further considerations. First, the recent increase in debt was raised<br />

especially by relatively weak borrowers, such as local governments with fragile<br />

income streams and, in particular, companies active in construction and other<br />

sectors (e.g. the steel producing industry) plagued by overcapacity (the driver<br />

of private debt in Figure 4.26). Second, credit was granted by relatively weak<br />

lenders, as shown by the sharp increase of the weight of shadow banking (trust<br />

funds, etc.) within total lending (Figure 4.28).<br />

These factors help to explain the Chinese effort for structural reforms aiming<br />

at supporting potential growth and breaking the formation of a vicious spiral<br />

between leverage and growth. The success of this effort will be crucial to the<br />

future of China. However, it is legitimate to be sceptical about the potential<br />

of reforms to boost short-term growth, even reforms that are successful in the<br />

medium term.<br />

In China, as elsewhere, it is hard to identify in advance the leverage breaking<br />

point beyond which a crisis enfolds. It is less hard, however, to interpret the current<br />

debt dynamics of debt as unsustainable. Most likely, the Chinese government is<br />

aware of the adverse dynamics that we have described and is willing to start a<br />

process of deleveraging. At least initially, this process should be in the form of a<br />

moderation in the pace of the leveraging up of the economy. However, there will

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