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Case studies 67<br />
Figure 4.24 Measures of real and nominal GDP growth in China<br />
13.0<br />
12.5<br />
12.0<br />
11.5<br />
11.0<br />
10.5<br />
10.0<br />
9.5<br />
9.0<br />
8.5<br />
8.0<br />
7.5<br />
7.0<br />
HP Filter<br />
Measures of Chinese real GDP growth<br />
WTO<br />
6-year moving average<br />
Potential: 3-year moving average<br />
6.5<br />
91 93 95 97 99 01 03 05 07 09 11 13<br />
26<br />
25<br />
24<br />
23<br />
22<br />
21<br />
20<br />
19<br />
18<br />
17<br />
16<br />
15<br />
14<br />
13<br />
12<br />
11<br />
10<br />
9<br />
Measures of Chinese nominal GDP growth<br />
6-year moving average<br />
HP Filter<br />
91 93 95 97 99 01 03 05 07 09 11 13<br />
Source: Authors’ calculations based on OECD and national accounts data.<br />
The acceleration of potential growth is consistent with strong data on productivity<br />
and demographic growth in the first half of the first decade of this century (see<br />
Figure 4.25). In this period of strong, organic expansion, leverage in the Chinese<br />
economy was consistently stable.<br />
Consistent with the ‘leverage cycle’ hypothesis (see Chapter 3), it was only<br />
when growth started to fade that China decided to ‘fight the trend’ by leveraging<br />
up. In particular, the 2008 debt crisis in advanced economies hurt Chinese exports<br />
at a time when the productivity boost stemming from the WTO accession and<br />
the impulse from demographics were about to turn.