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6 Deleveraging, What Deleveraging<br />

level (below which debt levels are safe enough that this feedback loop is not<br />

operative).<br />

There is considerable evidence that a high stock of debt increases vulnerability<br />

to the risk of a financial crisis. 4 The three main types of crisis are banking crises,<br />

sovereign debt crises and external crises (where an economy is unable to rollover<br />

its external debt and/or obtain external funding to cover a current account<br />

deficit). These crises can occur in isolation or in various combinations (Reinhart<br />

and Rogoff, 2009). Moreover, a crisis along one dimension can trigger crises<br />

along the other dimensions. For instance, a sudden stop in external funding may<br />

induce a wave of bankruptcies that threaten the banking sector, while the (direct<br />

and indirect) costs of a banking crisis may generate a sovereign debt crisis. In the<br />

other direction, of course, a sovereign debt crisis can undermine the health of the<br />

banking system and also lead to non-repayment of foreign liabilities.<br />

Excessive debt levels also can give rise to moral hazard problems and<br />

distributional conflicts across sectors. For instance, a government may choose to<br />

take over private liabilities, either for efficiency reasons or in response to political<br />

pressure. In turn, the anticipation of such fiscal bailouts may lead to lower<br />

repayment discipline among private-sector creditors, especially if debt problems<br />

are sufficiently widespread in the population to render punishment threats noncredible<br />

(Arellano and Kocherlakota, 2014). A similar logic applies if banks are<br />

taken into public ownership and private-sector debtors believe that governmentowned<br />

banks will take a softer line in enforcing repayment. Finally, from a<br />

national perspective, the aggregate net international investment position fixes<br />

an aggregate resource constraint for the economy: if the aggregate economy is<br />

highly indebted vis-à-vis the rest of the world, there is a limit to the effectiveness<br />

of domestic policies in shifting debt obligations across sectors. In contrast, a<br />

sectoral debt problem in a creditor economy poses fewer risks, since those sectors<br />

that have positive levels of net financial assets provide a counterweight to those<br />

sectors with stocks of net financial liabilities. This basic consideration illustrates<br />

the different implications of high stocks of sovereign debt in creditor countries<br />

(such as Japan) versus debtor countries (such as the euro periphery).<br />

Moreover, the 2007-onwards global financial crisis has provided fresh<br />

evidence that the resolution of severe crises is extremely costly. 5 At a global level,<br />

the advanced economies suffered a severe recession during 2008-10, while the<br />

second wave of the crisis in Europe from 2011 onwards further prolonged subpar<br />

macroeconomic performance across large parts of the Eurozone. Looking across<br />

countries, the severity of the crisis in terms of the decline in consumption and<br />

investment was most severe in those countries that had accumulated the largest<br />

debt imbalances during the pre-crisis credit boom of 2003-07 (Giannone et al.,<br />

2011; Lane and Milesi-Ferretti, 2011, 2012, 2014). Finally, the international<br />

nature of the crisis also highlights the interdependence across modern financial<br />

systems – a crisis that is triggered by an isolated event in one country can quickly<br />

4 See, amongst many others, Reinhart and Rogoff (2009), Jorda et al. (2011), Gourinchas and Obstfeld<br />

(2012) and Catão and Milesi-Ferretti (2013).<br />

5 McKinsey Global Institute (2010) provides extensive evidence that macroeconomic recovery in the<br />

aftermath of financial crises tends to be extremely slow; see also Reinhart and Rogoff (2009).

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