1qGLG9p
1qGLG9p
1qGLG9p
Create successful ePaper yourself
Turn your PDF publications into a flip-book with our unique Google optimized e-Paper software.
80 Deleveraging, What Deleveraging<br />
A subtler outcome is the interest cost on government debt being reduced<br />
by encouraging the increase in the general price level even as it tilts incentives<br />
toward increased ownership of domestic currency nominal government debt<br />
through regulatory policy. The net result – financial repression – is often the<br />
recourse for governments burdened by debt (Reinhart and Sbrancia, 2014). The<br />
effect on the numerator of the ratio is to lower the path of debt over time by<br />
lowering the interest-service cost.<br />
The difficulty of working on the numerator makes focusing on the denominator<br />
especially seductive. This is most likely why countries under pressure, and under<br />
IMF direction, promise structural reform in order to increase the real GDP<br />
component over time. The evidence for growing out of a debt problem, however,<br />
is limited. Reinhart et al. (2012) examined the experience of 22 industrial<br />
economies from 1800 to 2010: in only two cases of 26 sustained debt overhangs<br />
in their sample was the ratio of debt to income reduced by a pick-up in economic<br />
growth. If real activity cannot grow sufficiently, an alternative is to encourage<br />
its nominal value to scale up. Historically, inflation is often the recourse for<br />
governments burdened by high levels of debt and is the companion to financial<br />
repression.<br />
In order to minimise the output losses of deleveraging policies, let alone of<br />
a crisis, a comparison of the recent experiences in the US and the Eurozone<br />
shows that a blend of policies has to be put in place: gradual deleveraging of<br />
the public sector (striking the right balance between long-term expenditure cuts<br />
and taxation measures so as to avoid an excessively procyclical impact on GDP),<br />
banking system restructuring (recapitalisation, bad banks and other measures),<br />
and monetary expansion (encompassing forms of outright monetary and credit<br />
easing) so as to minimise the adverse macro-financial impact of a credit crunch.<br />
All three strands of policy must be in place when both the public sector and the<br />
private sector need to be deleveraged. Still, eventually, overall deleveraging is<br />
required rather than a mere swap from private to public balance sheets.<br />
Timing is of the essence, since early action and the correct sequencing of<br />
policy implementation matters for the minimisation of output costs. Ideally, it is<br />
advisable first to implement supportive banking and monetary policies, so that<br />
credit can flow again and provide renewed support to activity. Only then should<br />
fiscal policy gradually turn contractionary, since a recovering economy is better<br />
able to absorb the associated drag on growth. By and large, this was the policy<br />
mix put in place in the US (even if the timing of fiscal adjustment was arguably<br />
still too early relative to the ideal path), while fiscal austerity came before the<br />
restructuring of the banking system in the Eurozone, which adversely affected<br />
output dynamics.<br />
Even with a supportive policy package, the deleveraging process can be painful<br />
and long-lasting. In the US, for instance, the deleveraging of the public sector<br />
balance sheet (both government and Federal Reserve), which was inflated in<br />
the past phase so as to give time to the private sector to start the process of<br />
deleveraging and prevent a credit crunch, has yet to occur and it is poised to<br />
be a long-lasting and risky process. In other terms, the ‘exit’ for both fiscal and<br />
monetary policy is just beginning.