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58 Deleveraging, What Deleveraging<br />
The euro periphery: The worst legacy<br />
If the aggregate Eurozone is a source of concern on account of the still high<br />
leverage ratios, the limited progress in deleveraging the financial sector, the<br />
negative impact of the associated credit crunch and the severe impact of the crisis<br />
on the real economy, all these problems look worse again in relation to the euro<br />
periphery. Indeed, the legacy of the two recent crises already experienced since<br />
2008 means a chronic liability and economic slack overhang that will hamper<br />
macro-financial performance in the coming years. It also means vulnerability to<br />
any future spike in international funding conditions, given the major rollover<br />
exposures faced by these countries. The output losses since 2008 show completely<br />
different dynamics between the core and the periphery (Figure 4.17). Indeed, as<br />
shown in the chart, while German output is by now well above 2008:Q1 levels,<br />
and in France it has recovered the loss, in Greece it is about 25% below, in Italy<br />
about 9% below, and it is still well below in the other peripheral countries.<br />
Figure 4.17 Eurozone and selected member countries’ output levels<br />
104<br />
100<br />
96<br />
92<br />
EMU GDP (Q1 08 = 100)<br />
88<br />
84<br />
EMU<br />
Spain<br />
Italy<br />
Portugal<br />
80 Germany Ireland<br />
Greece<br />
France<br />
76<br />
08 09 10 11 12 13<br />
Source: Authors’ calculations based on national accounts data.<br />
As shown in Figure 4.18, the divergent core and periphery dynamics reflect,<br />
amongst other factors, a much more severe credit crunch, especially after 2011<br />
(see the previous section). Figure 4.19 and Table 4.3 show the leverage dynamics<br />
and the sectoral composition of debt for selected European economies.