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Case studies 71<br />
be a price to pay for this policy since slower credit formation, the main support<br />
for growth in recent years, would likely translate into a substantial slowdown in<br />
activity.<br />
Figure 4.28 Chinese debt breakdown by lenders<br />
China total lending breakdown, 2008<br />
Central gov.<br />
debt<br />
11%<br />
Non-banking<br />
financing<br />
23%<br />
Bank loan<br />
66%<br />
China total lending breakdown, 2012<br />
Central gov<br />
debt<br />
7%<br />
Non-banking<br />
financing<br />
33%<br />
Bank loan<br />
60%<br />
Source: Authors’ calculations based on national data.<br />
This takes us to the difficult analysis of what lies ahead for China, or better, what<br />
kind of crisis we should expect. Following our taxonomy in Appendix 3A, should<br />
we expect full-blown ‘Type 1’ or ‘Type 3’ crisis, or a slow-burn ‘Type 2’ crisis<br />
The breakdown of the Chinese debt displayed in Table 2.1 offers some crucial<br />
elements for the analysis. Let us highlight the following facts: (a) the government<br />
has a low debt relative to GDP (49% of GDP if one includes local governments, 26%<br />
for the central government only); and (b) Chinese debt is virtually all domestic,<br />
similar to that of Japan. These conditions mean that the central government<br />
has at the current stage the resources to contain systemic risk (for instance,<br />
intervening to avoid a ‘too-big-to-fail’ default) and that policymakers have very<br />
little incentive to proceed towards an explicit default, since it would hurt mainly<br />
domestic investors. Therefore, a Russian or an Argentine default scenario is not<br />
likely since in both those cases, the bulk of debt was held by foreign investors,