1qGLG9p

Recommendations

Info

106 Deleveraging, What Deleveraging Myers, S. (1977), “The Determinants of Corporate Borrowing”, Journal of Financial Economics 5(2), pp. 147-175. Olney, M. L. (1999), “Avoiding Default: The Role of Credit in the Consumption Collapse of 1930”, Quarterly Journal of Economics 114(1), pp. 319-335. Paris, P. and Wyplosz, C. (2014), PADRE: Politically Acceptable Debt Restructuring in the Eurozone, Geneva Reports on the World Economy, Special Report 3, London: CEPR and Geneva: ICMB. Rajan, R. (2010), Fault Lines: How Hidden Fractures Still Threaten the World Economy, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. Reichlin, L. (2014), “Monetary Policy and Banks in the Euro Area: The Tale of Two Crises”, Journal of Macroeconomics 39(PB), pp. 387-400. Reinhart, C. M. and K. S Rogoff (2009), “The Aftermath of Financial Crises”, American Economic Review 99(2), pp. 466-72. Reinhart, C. M. and K. S. Rogoff (2010), “Growth in a Time of Debt”, American Economic Review 100(2), pp. 573–578. Reinhart, C. M. and V. R. Reinhart (2010), “The Decade After the Fall: Diminished Expectations, Double Dips, and External Shocks”, VoxEU.org, 13 September. Reinhart, C. M. and M. B. Sbrancia (2014), “The Liquidation of Government Debt,” Economic Policy, forthcoming. Reinhart, C. M., V. R. Reinhart and K. S. Rogoff (2012), “Public Debt Overhangs: Advanced-Economy Episodes since 1800”, Journal of Economic Perspectives 26(3), pp. 69-86. Sachs, J. D. (1989), “Conditionality, Debt Relief, and the Developing Country Debt Crisis”, in J. D. Sachs (ed.), Developing Country Debt and the World Economy, Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press. Shin, H. S. (2013), “The Second Phase of Global Liquidity and Its Impact on Emerging Markets”, mimeo, Princeton University. Stein J. C. (2012), “Evaluating Large-Scale Asset Purchases”, speech at the Brookings Institution, Washington, DC, 11 October. Summers, L. (2013), “Secular Stagnation,” speech at the 14th IMF Annual Research Conference, Washington, DC, 8 November. Tirole, J. (2012), “Country Solidarity, Private Sector Involvement and the Contagion of Sovereign Crises”, mimeo, Toulouse University.
It is widely accepted that high levels of debt (of various forms) have played a central role in the 2008-09 global financial crisis, the 2010-12 euro crisis and many previous crisis episodes. The adverse macroeconomic impact of deleveraging also helps to explain the slow pace of recovery among the advanced economies in recent years, while the post-2009 surge in debt accumulation in a number of emerging markets (especially China) raises the prospect of a new wave of debt-related crises unless corrective policies are implemented. This report provides a multi-dimensional perspective on leverage for both advanced and emerging economies. The report’s comprehensive approach includes both public and private debt, with the latter broken down on sectoral lines (households, non-financial corporates, financial sector). It emphasises the macroeconomic impact of leverage, with a sharp distinction between ‘normal’ recessions and the long-lasting impact on output generated by excessive leverage and financial crises. ISBN: 978-1-907142-79-6 The report shows that the world has not yet begun to de-lever and global debt ratios are breaking new highs. At the same time, in a poisonous combination, world underlying growth and inflation are also lower than previously expected, reducing global debt capacity. The authors argue that central banks in advanced economies should be slow to raise interest rates, given the fragile deleveraging process. Moreover, the European Central Bank should pursue an aggressive policy of quantitative easing in order to fulfill its mandate of price stability while fostering debt stabilisation and easing credit conditions. However, successful exit from a leverage trap also includes appropriate fiscal and macro-prudential policies, together with the restructuring of privatesector (bank, household, corporate) debt and sovereign debt where required. Furthermore, given the risks and costs associated with excessive leverage, the authors argue that more needs to be done to improve resilience to debt shocks and discourage excessive debt accumulation. Centre for Economic Policy Research 3rd Floor • 77 Bastwick Street • LONDON EC1V 3PZ • UK TEL: +44 (0)20 7183 8801 • FAX: +44 (0)20 7183 8820 • EMAIL: cepr@cepr.org www.cepr.org ISBN 978-1-907142-79-6 9 781907 142796
Page 1:
Geneva Reports on the World Economy
Page 4 and 5:
International Center for Monetary a
Page 6 and 7:
International Center for Monetary a
Page 8 and 9:
Acknowledgements We thank Susan Lun
Page 11 and 12:
List of Conference Participants Edm
Page 13 and 14:
List of Conference Participants xi
Page 15 and 16:
List of Conference Participants xii
Page 17:
Foreword Since 1999 the Geneva Repo
Page 20 and 21:
2 Deleveraging, What Deleveraging 1
Page 22 and 23:
4 Deleveraging, What Deleveraging S
Page 24 and 25:
6 Deleveraging, What Deleveraging l
Page 26 and 27:
8 Deleveraging, What Deleveraging i
Page 29 and 30:
2 Global debt analysis: Deleveragin
Page 31 and 32:
Global debt analysis: Deleveraging
Page 33 and 34:
Page 35:
Page 38 and 39:
20 Deleveraging, What Deleveraging
Page 40 and 41:
Page 42 and 43:
Page 44 and 45:
Page 46 and 47:
Page 48 and 49:
Page 50 and 51:
Page 52 and 53:
Page 54 and 55:
Page 56 and 57:
Page 58 and 59:
Page 60 and 61:
Page 62 and 63:
Page 64 and 65:
Page 66 and 67:
Page 68 and 69:
Page 70 and 71:
Page 72 and 73:
Page 74 and 75: 56 Deleveraging, What Deleveraging
Page 105 and 106: 6 Discussions Morning discussion Ma
Page 107 and 108: Discussions 89 He also agreed with
Page 109 and 110: Discussions 91 urged the authors to
Page 111 and 112: Discussions 93 moving demographic c
Page 113 and 114: Discussions 95 about potential GDP
Page 115 and 116: Discussions 97 when there is no com
Page 117 and 118: Discussions 99 In response to Laure
Page 119 and 120: Data Appendix Debt typically expres
Page 121 and 122: References Adrian, T., E. Moench an
Page 123: References 105 Jorda, O., M. Schula
show all

1qGLG9p

Create successful ePaper yourself

Delete template?

Save as template?