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64 Deleveraging, What Deleveraging<br />
Figure 4.23 Eurozone countries’ household and corporate debt<br />
130<br />
120<br />
110<br />
100<br />
90<br />
80<br />
70<br />
60<br />
50<br />
40<br />
30<br />
20<br />
10<br />
0<br />
A. Private debt - household (% of GDP)<br />
Germany<br />
Spain<br />
Greece<br />
Ireland<br />
France<br />
Italy<br />
Portugal<br />
01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 10 11 12 13<br />
170<br />
160<br />
150<br />
140<br />
130<br />
120<br />
110<br />
100<br />
90<br />
80<br />
70<br />
60<br />
50<br />
40<br />
B. Private debt - corporate ex-financials (% of GDP)<br />
Germany<br />
Spain<br />
Greece<br />
France<br />
Italy<br />
Portugal<br />
01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 10 11 12 13<br />
Source: Authors’ calculations based on national accounts data.<br />
Figure 4.23 shows that non-financial corporates also accrued extra debt during<br />
2003-07, but with the exception of France, this has stabilised since the crisis. 25<br />
Taken together, Section 4.2.2 has shown that the legacy of the crisis for<br />
the euro periphery is very high levels of sectoral debt and net external debt.<br />
Consistent with the overall themes of this report, these debt overhangs represent<br />
a substantial drag on the potential growth performance of this group. In addition,<br />
it renders the group vulnerable to the normalisation of global long-term interest<br />
rates and exposed in the event of a future disruption in international financial<br />
markets.<br />
25 The sharp increase in the debt of non-financial corporates in Ireland since 2007 can be explained<br />
by the tax-driven financial engineering activities of the domestic affiliates of global firms, and is not<br />
matched by local firms.