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Leverage cycles 35<br />
economy j is denoted as Y p j,t<br />
, then the net present value of future output in real<br />
terms, or the discounted sum of all future income, NPV j,t<br />
is given as:<br />
NPV j,t<br />
=<br />
P<br />
Y j, t+i<br />
(1 + j<br />
) i<br />
i=0<br />
where ρ is some constant discount rate to be specified later. 17 It is convenient to<br />
express the future path of potential output as the product of the current level and<br />
compounded future growth rates. If the growth rate is assumed to be constant at<br />
σ j<br />
, then we have:<br />
i<br />
1+<br />
P<br />
NPV j,t<br />
= Y<br />
j<br />
j, t<br />
i=0 1+ j<br />
In turn, this simplifies to:<br />
P 1<br />
NPV j,t<br />
= Y j, t<br />
j<br />
j<br />
This framework suggests three opportunities to set off a leverage cycle as<br />
debt capacity turns out to be less ample than anticipated when new debt was<br />
accumulated. Because the calculation of debt capacity involves a ratio, the<br />
mistake could be in the numerator (the right level of output at which to start the<br />
path) or the denominator (expected growth or the appropriate discount rate).<br />
Three types of expectation errors are illustrated by Greece, Ireland and Italy.<br />
According to IMF estimates, Greek real GDP was 10% above its potential level by<br />
2008. Since this was not sufficiently recognised at the time (contemporaneous<br />
estimates of potential output were more optimistic), these dynamics opened up<br />
the possibility that borrowers might misinterpret an overstretched economy as a<br />
new standard of sustainable output, and take on excessive debt.<br />
Revisions to the denominator have a more dramatic impact. Ireland is the<br />
advanced economy for which the IMF’s estimate of potential output growth<br />
moved within the widest range. In the mid-1980s, the Irish economy was<br />
expected to expand at a sub 2% pace. By 1998, the estimate of secular growth<br />
had breached 9%. Robust estimates followed for a time, but then the assessment<br />
turned markedly lower, declining by about one percentage point every year<br />
starting in 2000, and bottoming at net contractions in potential output from<br />
2009 to 2011. These sharp swings in growth prospects followed through to even<br />
sharper movements in the nation’s ability to take on debt in real terms through<br />
the extrapolation of current potential output growth estimates in estimating the<br />
present value of future income streams.<br />
17 Assuming a constant discount rate may be giving the game away at the outset. Cochrane (2011) argues<br />
that time variation in the discount rate is critical in understanding asset prices.