1qGLG9p
1qGLG9p
1qGLG9p
You also want an ePaper? Increase the reach of your titles
YUMPU automatically turns print PDFs into web optimized ePapers that Google loves.
Policy issues 81<br />
Needless to say, this ideal sequencing is only feasible if the central government<br />
balance sheet is strong enough to be leveraged up initially and thus contribute<br />
to the deleveraging of the private sector. This was the case in Spain, for instance,<br />
where public debt was very low at the beginning of the crisis, which allowed the<br />
country to run larger deficits for longer, but not in Italy, which was forced into<br />
steeper austerity and thus recession. In China, as mentioned above, the low debt<br />
of the central government is a source of strength.<br />
Sometimes, the ideal set of policies is prevented by the institutional setup. In<br />
the Eurozone, for instance, the sequencing was jeopardised by the reluctance<br />
of policymakers of core countries to put in place any form of transfer (either<br />
fiscal or monetary) to the periphery. Indeed, it can be argued that the fear that<br />
at some stage transfers would be necessary induced European policymakers to<br />
force a steeper-than-necessary public sector deleveraging in the periphery. By the<br />
same token, the possibly asymmetric impact of QE across member countries is a<br />
political barrier to the introduction of non-standard monetary measures by the<br />
ECB, a complicating factor not faced by the central banks of politically integrated<br />
economies (such as the US, the UK or Japan).<br />
5.2 Policy options. Where are we now<br />
There is still a lot of work to do for policymakers. The legacy of the crisis is<br />
still a major issue for a number of developed economies – especially in the euro<br />
periphery – which remain extremely vulnerable, and ahead of the next financial<br />
crisis, with early signs already visible this time around in some emerging<br />
economies and especially in China.<br />
Since the above-mentioned adverse combination of leverage and slower<br />
nominal GDP has hurt global debt capacity, the path for successful deleveraging<br />
policy looks quite narrow; indeed, there is a high likelihood of either a prolonged<br />
period of very low growth or even another global crisis.<br />
Policymakers are deeply divided on how to address the combination of high<br />
debt, weak nominal growth and abundant global liquidity. The discussion is<br />
made difficult by the uncertainty about the strength of the recovery in developed<br />
markets and about the nature of the slowdown in some emerging markets.<br />
We discuss below some key policy issues.<br />
Issue 1. Monetary policy<br />
Interest rates are at an historically low level and influential institutions (most<br />
notably, the Bank for International Settlements) have warned that the world is<br />
again in a situation in which a protracted low interest rate environment is creating<br />
incentives for investors in search of yield to take excessive risk. According to this<br />
view, financial regulation is not sufficient to prevent new excesses in leverage,<br />
while central banks in countries where the economy is strengthening, such as<br />
the US and the UK, should envisage an exit from very accommodative monetary<br />
policies.