AN AUGURY OF REVOLUTION: THE IRANIAN STUDENT ...
AN AUGURY OF REVOLUTION: THE IRANIAN STUDENT ...
AN AUGURY OF REVOLUTION: THE IRANIAN STUDENT ...
Create successful ePaper yourself
Turn your PDF publications into a flip-book with our unique Google optimized e-Paper software.
Even though Jimmy Carter used human rights as a platform in the 1976 election and it<br />
was central to thinking, Iran seemed to be treated differently than other nations because of their<br />
vital strategic and economic importance. The ISAUS believed that Carter’s human rights policy<br />
was “nothing but a mirage, camouflaged to fool our people…” 508<br />
The Carter administration<br />
reaffirmed “support for a strong Iran, noting that Iran’s security is a matter of the highest priority<br />
for this country.” 509 The reality of Carter’s Iran policy led the ISAUS to believe that “The main<br />
thrust of Carter’s international policy as it regards Iran is to preserve U.S. imperialist domination<br />
over Iran and the Persian Gulf.” 510 While approximately two hundred Iranian students protested<br />
outside the White House in Washington on 31 December 1977, Jimmy Carter was spending his<br />
New Year’s Eve in Tehran where he toasted the shah by reiterating Kissinger’s belief that Iran<br />
was an “island of stability in one of the more troubled areas of the world.” 511<br />
By 1977, the inertia of the policy that began around 1967 was too much to stop. William<br />
Stueck noted that “In most government settings, short of a disastrous turn of events or<br />
overwhelming evidence of such a turn on the horizon, policymakers tend to hold rather than alter<br />
established policy.” 512<br />
Jimmy Carter and his predecessors missed the overwhelming evidence<br />
that Iranian students abroad provided them. William Sullivan, referring to some of the younger<br />
members of Congress, said that “They were more closely attuned to the younger generation,<br />
which reflected the dissidence of Iranian students and their American sympathizers.” 513 These<br />
younger congressmen warned Sullivan and other American politicians and diplomats of the<br />
508 ISAUS, U.S. Involvement in Iran, Part 1, 77.<br />
509 “Shah, Shifting Stand, Pledges to Oppose Increase in Oil Price, He Offers to Give U.S. ‘A Break,’ Iran’s Ruler<br />
Makes Promise After two days of Talks with Carter – Invites More Western Goods,” NYT, 17 November 1977, p. 1.<br />
510 ISAUS, Condemn Shah’s U.S. Visit, 3-4.<br />
511 Jimmy Carter, Keeping Faith: Memoirs of a President (New York: Bantam Books, 1982), 437; “Iranians Protest<br />
at White House Against Carter’s Visit to Iran, NYT, 1 January 1978, p. 12.<br />
512 William Stueck, Rethinking the Korean War: A New Diplomatic and Strategic History (Princeton University<br />
Press, 2002), 115.<br />
513 Sullivan, Mission to Iran, 32.<br />
121