AN AUGURY OF REVOLUTION: THE IRANIAN STUDENT ...
AN AUGURY OF REVOLUTION: THE IRANIAN STUDENT ...
AN AUGURY OF REVOLUTION: THE IRANIAN STUDENT ...
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was dubious of the secular nature of the group. 286<br />
However, pragmatism led Khomeini to<br />
instruct his followers to cooperate with secular leftists in the 1960s. 287 While this relationship<br />
was tenuous, it represented the variety of groups that held the common interest in their hatred of<br />
the shah. While the shah’s plans for modernization alienated the traditional and religious groups<br />
of society, his lack of political freedoms infuriated newly emerging groups and classes, such as<br />
the growing number of students and university educated Iranians. 288 The impact of the shah’s<br />
rule could clearly be seen on the Iranian student movement of the 1960s.<br />
Both secular leftists and Islamists offered an alternate political discourse for the future of<br />
Iran. While they often cooperated in order to form a broad anti-shah coalition, these diverging<br />
ideologies played a major role in the splits that eventually occurred in the CISNU. This uneasy<br />
tension can be seen in the relationship between Qotbzadeh and Fatemi. Early on, even as there<br />
was solidarity between the two while they fought deportation during their days in leadership of<br />
the ISAUS, tension grew between them. “As much as he loved Sadegh for his intelligence and<br />
commitment, Fatemi grew wary of Sadegh and his politics of Islam,” and this forced them to<br />
drift apart. 289 The treatment of the clergy in Iran further radicalized Iranian students, and<br />
Islamists such as Qotbzadeh began to form their own groups. However, while Islamists and<br />
secularists drifted apart, there was not full-blown animosity between the groups in the mid-<br />
1960s.<br />
While the shah acted forcefully against any opposition in Iran, anti-shah demonstrations<br />
continued throughout the United States. By the autumn of 1965, the shah was still aggravated by<br />
the reluctance of the U.S. government to do anything about their behavior. His concern with<br />
286 Matin-asgari, Iranian Student Opposition to the Shah, 72-3, 85.<br />
287 Hoveyda, The Shah and the Ayatollah, 27.<br />
288 For a discussion on social classes in Iran refer to Keddie, Modern Iran: Roots and Results of Revolution.<br />
289 Jerome, The Man in the Mirror, 57.<br />
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