AN AUGURY OF REVOLUTION: THE IRANIAN STUDENT ...

With the trip postponed, the briefing was not necessary. However, Johnson, Meyer, Walt Rostow
and NSC Middle East staffer Harold Saunders still met to discuss how the war would affect
American foreign policy in the Middle East. A senior NSC advisor suggested that with Nasser
now “finished,” the shah should become “our man” in the region. 336
The Six Day War was a critical turning point. Assessing the impact that the war had on
American arms sales to Iran, Barry Rubin contends that it was “a dramatic event” that “signaled
a turning point in the shah’s victory over the vestiges of the Kennedy policy of arms restraint.” 337
With growing instability between the Arabs and Israelis, Iran, which consists mainly of Persians
and had ties to Israel, became more important to American policymakers. Meyer and National
Security Advisor Walt Rostow were the most influential promoters of closer ties to the shah’s
regime. Both men were aware of the grievances of Iranian students. However, drastic political
changes in the Middle East led them to solidify the relationship between Washington and
Tehran. In Tehran, Meyer described the shah’s rule in very favorable terms and discouraged
foreign service officers from making contacts with the opposition. Meyer’s reporting was a
sharp break from that of previous ambassador to Iran, Julius Holmes, who encouraged more
objective reporting on affairs in Iran. In Washington, Walt Rostow was very pro-shah and had a
great deal of influence on President Johnson. 338
As a result, CIA Director Richard Helms told Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara
that the shah’s August 1967 visit “may well be a critical point in the history of our relations with
modern Iran.” 339 The 1967 trip also represented a visible turning point in the political beliefs of
the Iranian student movement. Mansur Rafizadeh, who was the SAVAK chief of operations in
336 Meyer, Quiet Diplomacy, 82.
337 Rubin, Paved With Good Intentions, 120-1.
338 Bill, The Eagle and the Lion, 173-4.
339 Memorandum from Director of Central Intelligence Helms to Secretary of Defense McNamara, “The Shah of
Iran,” 16 May 1967, FRUS 1964-1968, Vol. XXII, 366.
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