AN AUGURY OF REVOLUTION: THE IRANIAN STUDENT ...

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proceedings should take place against Fatemi and Qotbzadeh, even though it could not be proven whether or not they were involved in the incident. 159 Following the volatile summer of 1963, the already sensitive issue of student protest abroad became a major policy issue for the U.S. government. Iranian Foreign Minister Abbas Aram stated that Iranian student activity in the United States was a matter of utmost importance that was damaging U.S. – Iranian relations, and he pressed the issue during his trip to the United States in September and October 1963 to numerous American officials. 160 Aram said that the student problem was “a very serious situation which is receiving the personal attention of the Shah,” and that it “was having an increasingly deleterious effect on United States-Iran relations.” 161 Referring to Iranian students in the United States, Aram said that “they are hooligans, not students…and their aim is to damage U.S. – Iranian relations.” 162 Most likely referring to Robert Kennedy, Aram also said that many of the student leaders were in touch with very high American officials. 163 The shah was already wary of the Kennedy administration’s emphasis on reform and the feelings expressed by Aram indicated that the behavior of Iranian students added to his suspicion. Student protests added to the fact that the shah was dubious of the intentions of 159 Telegram from American Embassy in Tehran (Julius Holmes) to Secretary of State Dean Rusk, 28 September 1963, General Records of the Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File 1963, Box 3260, Folder EDX IRAN, RG 59, NA. 160 “Telegram from the USUN New York to Ruehcr/Secretary of State in Washington, D.C.,” 30 September 1963, General Records of the Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, 1963, Box 3943, Folder POL IRAN A, RG 59, NA; Memorandum of Conversation between Dean Rusk, John W. Bowling, and Abbas Aram, “U.S. - Iranian Relations – Iranian Students,” 30 September 1963, General Records of the Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, 1963, Box 3943, Folder POL IRAN-US, RG 59, NA; Memorandum of Conversation between Iranian Foreign Minister Abbas Aram, Iranian Ambassador Mamud Foroughi, Phillips Talbot and Katherine W. Bracken, “United States – Iranian Relations (Part 1 of 2),” 7 October 1963, General Records of the Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File 1963, Box 3943, Folder POL IRAN-US A, RG 59, NA. 161 Memo of Conversation, “U.S. - Iranian Relations – Iranian Students,” 30 September 1963, RG 59, NA; Memo of Conversation, “United States – Iranian Relations (Part 1 of 2),” 7 October 1963, RG 59, NA. 162 Memo of Conversation, “U.S. - Iranian Relations – Iranian Students,” 30 September 1963, RG 59, NA. 163 Memo of Conversation, “U.S. - Iranian Relations – Iranian Students,” 30 September 1963, RG 59, NA; Memo of Conversation, “United States – Iranian Relations (Part 1 of 2),” 7 October 1963, RG 59, NA. 44
progressive-mindedness that characterized who he called the “Harvard boys.” 164 The Kennedy administration stressed economic, social, and political reforms and believed that “Those who make peaceful revolution impossible will make violent revolution inevitable.” 165 In October 1961 U.S. Ambassador to Iran Julius Holmes told David Lilienthal, an American entrepreneur in Iran and former director of the Tennessee Valley Authority, that the shah believed that Kennedy’s statements meant that the United States was going to support revolution in Iran. 166 Members of the ISAUS were aware of this tension between the shah and the Kennedy administration. They also knew that if they played their cards right, they had an opportunity to influence American foreign policy with Iran. Iranian students in the United States desired to alter both the opinions of foreign governments and public opinion regarding the shah’s regime. However, they despised the Kennedy-influenced White Revolution. After the shah’s brutal reaction to the demonstrations throughout the summer of 1963, the CISNU came to believe that the shah’s “reform from above before getting caught up in reveloution [sic] from below” was “nonsense.” 167 The ISAUS believed that their duty was “to communicate to the American working class and all peace loving people in the US to the actual nature of the people’s struggle in the Middle East” 168 This language, particularly the emphasis on the working class and peace loving people, is indicative of the group’s drift towards communist ideology, and away from beliefs resembling the National Front. By the fall of 1963 Secretary of State Dean Rusk believed that the activities of Iranian students in the United States had strained relations with Iran badly enough that the U.S. 164 Armin Meyer, Quiet Diplomacy: From Cairo to Tokyo in the Twilight of Imperialism (New York: iUniverse, Inc, 2003), 134. 165 Pollack, The Persian Puzzle, 81. 166 David E. Lilienthal, The Journals of David E. Lilienthal, Volume 5: Harvest Years, 1959-1963 (New York: Harper and Row, 1971), 258. 167 CISNU, Iranian Peoples’ Movement, 1953-1973, Iran Report, no. 2, June 1974, 15. 168 ISAUS, In Solidarity with the Palestinian Revolution, (Houston, Texas: Iranian Students Association in the United States, 1976), 20. 45
Page 1 and 2: AN AUGURY OF REVOLUTION: THE IRANIA
Page 3 and 4: ABSTRACT The Iranian student moveme
Page 5 and 6: ACKNOWLEDGMENTS There are many peop
Page 7 and 8: DEDICATION This thesis is dedicated
Page 9 and 10: CHAPTER I - INTRODUCTION AND HISTOR
Page 11 and 12: a blank check to purchase any non-n
Page 13 and 14: and collective confrontation of ill
Page 15 and 16: The Iranian intelligentsia that bec
Page 17 and 18: man.” 20 More and more Iranians h
Page 19 and 20: developments took place during the
Page 21 and 22: 7,610 students. 39 James Bill ackno
Page 23 and 24: the potential to provide an alterna
Page 25 and 26: ole that the United States was assu
Page 27 and 28: and Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini ret
Page 29 and 30: Mosaddeq was soft on communism, res
Page 31 and 32: decade. Inequality, imperialism, co
Page 33 and 34: Iranian Students.” 77 Fereydoun H
Page 35 and 36: visit he made from the early 1960s
Page 37 and 38: Iranian general recalled that when
Page 39 and 40: epresented a wide variety of politi
Page 41 and 42: Iranian student protests in the ear
Page 43 and 44: government. 114 Information from th
Page 45 and 46: “Their message was clear: Don’t
Page 47 and 48: on six issues. Land reform was one
Page 49 and 50: Roosevelt of California. 143 Faribo
Page 51: a group of picketing Iranian studen
Page 55 and 56: embarrassing to the United States G
Page 57 and 58: Throughout Kennedy’s presidency,
Page 59 and 60: of an impossible leader - - by enli
Page 61 and 62: The shah saw Iranian students abroa
Page 63 and 64: people. Show the Shah that you cond
Page 65 and 66: warned the Iranian students that th
Page 67 and 68: Iranian students under warning from
Page 69 and 70: people whether they were themselves
Page 71 and 72: unprecedented, with the exception o
Page 73 and 74: ecause they were active members and
Page 75 and 76: youth organizations such as the Fre
Page 77 and 78: approchement with the Soviet Union
Page 79 and 80: Iranian students in the United Stat
Page 81 and 82: condemnation of American imperialis
Page 83 and 84: quarterly publication of the ISAUS,
Page 85 and 86: States. When Bunting asked if the g
Page 87 and 88: the police used four water cannons
Page 89 and 90: With the trip postponed, the briefi
Page 91 and 92: diplomats in Tehran noted that they
Page 93 and 94: the modernization of education thre
Page 95 and 96: The shah made his last visit to the
Page 97 and 98: intimately involved in the U.S. cou
Page 99 and 100: CHAPTER IV - THE RADICALIZATION OF
Page 101 and 102: and networking with western student
Page 103 and 104:
Marxists had taken place.” 393 Fo
Page 105 and 106:
Demonstrations occurred in Iran tha
Page 107 and 108:
agents in the Iranian Embassy in Wa
Page 109 and 110:
student movement abroad was by far
Page 111 and 112:
The group ended up receiving cots f
Page 113 and 114:
were the result of high unemploymen
Page 115 and 116:
egan to give the wrong people hairc
Page 117 and 118:
opportunities for the CIS and well-
Page 119 and 120:
with a group of Iranian students fr
Page 121 and 122:
same day the lavish ceremonies were
Page 123 and 124:
For the rest of the shah’s rule,
Page 125 and 126:
question the nature of American inv
Page 127 and 128:
over.” 499 As a result of a possi
Page 129 and 130:
Even though Jimmy Carter used human
Page 131 and 132:
augury stretched far beyond that on
Page 133 and 134:
percent were inspired by communism.
Page 135 and 136:
etaliatory response to the hostages
Page 137 and 138:
did not desire the establishment of
Page 139 and 140:
further radicalized the opposition.
Page 141 and 142:
Douglas, William O. The Court Years
Page 143 and 144:
Sick, Gary. All Fall Down: America
Page 145 and 146:
Demonstrate: Tuesday, Sept. 1st, 4:
Page 147 and 148:
SECONDARY SOURCES Abrahamian, Ervan
Page 149 and 150:
Dixon, David and Shirin Hakimzadeh.
Page 151 and 152:
Heineman, Kenneth J. Campus Wars: T
Page 153 and 154:
McAlister, Melani. Epic Encounters:
Page 155 and 156:
Von Dirke, Sabine. “All Power to
Page 157 and 158:
(above) Figure 3. Ali Mohammad Fate
Page 159 and 160:
(above) Figure 8. Heading of demons
Page 161 and 162:
(above) Figure 12. Masked Iranian s
Page 163 and 164:
(below) Figure16. Front page of ISA
Page 165:
(left) Figure 19. The battle lines
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