AN AUGURY OF REVOLUTION: THE IRANIAN STUDENT ...

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American involvement in Iran in his 1967 work, Iran: The New Imperialism in Action. 52 Fred Halliday shared Nirumand’s view of America’s imperialist intentions in his 1979 work Iran: Dictatorship and Development. 53 Because of the emergence of the revisionist arguments, articulated by scholars such as Halliday and Nirumand, the historiographic debate was alive and well in the 1970s. 54 However, there was much less dichotomy in the scholarship on U.S. – Iranian relations that typical traditional and revisionist arguments reveal. Stephen McFarland made a very useful contribution to the literature when he reinterpreted the 1946 crisis and placed agency into the hands of the Iranians. 55 McFarland’s post-revisionist argument added new dynamics to the historiography of U.S. – Iranian relations. However, he was not as apologetic to American policymakers as John Lewis Gaddis, who initiated post-revisionism in 1972, or Bruce Kuniholm, who authored a post-revisionist argument on the origins of the Cold War in the Near East in 1980. 56 McFarland convincingly demonstrated how the Iranians played the great powers off of each other through the century-old strategy of movazaneh, or equilibrium. The history of Iran, and the modern Middle East, along with diplomatic relations between the United States and the Middle East, was changed forever in 1979 when the shah was deposed 52 Bahman Nirumand, Iran: The New Imperialism in Action (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1967); Revisionist arguments remained strong throughout the rest of the 1970s and 1980s, to see the evolution of the revisionist argument see Mark Hamilton Lytle, The Origins of the Iranian-American Alliance, 1941-1953 (New York: Holmes and Meier, 1987). 53 Fred Halliday, Iran: Dictatorship and Development (New York: Penguin Books, 1979). 54 For a traditional interpretation of the 1946 crisis in Iran refer to Richard Pfau, “Containment in Iran, 1946: The Shift to an Active Policy,” Diplomatic History, Vol. 1, No. 4 (October 1977), 359-372. For revisionist interpretations of the 1946 crisis refer to Lloyd C. Gardner, Architects of Illusion: Men and Ideas in American Foreign Policy, 1941-1949 (Chicago: Quadrangle Books, 1970), Joyce and Gabriel Kolko, The Limits of Power; The World and United States Foreign Policy, 1945-1954 (New York: Harper and Row, 1972), and James Goode, The United States and Iran, 1946-1951: The Diplomacy of Neglect (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1989). 55 Stephen L. McFarland, “A Peripheral View of the Origins of the Cold War: The Crises in Iran, 1941-1947,” Diplomatic History, Vol. 4, No. 4, (October 1980), 333-352. 56 John Lewis Gaddis, The United States and the Origins of the Cold War (Columbia University Press, 1972); John Lewis Gaddis, “The Emerging Post-Revisionist Synthesis on the Origins of the Cold War,” Diplomatic History, Volume 7, Issue 3 (July 1983), 171-190; Bruce Kuniholm, The Origins of the Cold War in the Near East: Great Power Conflict and Diplomacy in Iran, Turkey, and Greece (Princeton University Press, 1980). 18
and Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini returned to his native land, assumed power, and gave the Iranian Revolution a more anti-Western stance. Consequently, the historiography of U.S. – Iranian relations was also severely altered. When Iranian students stormed the U.S. embassy and took American diplomats and citizens hostage on 4 November 1979, the revisionist critique seemed to be verified. The animosity of Khomeini’s regime towards the United States led historians to question how relations between the two countries had grown to be so hostile. After 1979, historians of U.S. – Iranian relations had a new set of questions to answer. These included whether revolution was inevitable, and if it was not, to what extent the relationship between the shah and the United States played a part. Conflict emerged in the scholarship of the 1980s. There are many interpretations regarding the role that the United States played in projecting Iran towards revolution, and most fall between two polar extremes. Said Amir Arjomand’s 1988 publication, The Turban for the Crown: The Islamic Revolution in Iran, emphasized that the internal developments in Iran produced an atmosphere ripe for revolution. 57 Many scholars of Iranian history have asserted Arjomand’s thesis that the role of the United States was minimal in pushing Iran towards revolution. 58 Nikki Keddie emphasized by contrast that the internal developments in Iranian society and culture interacted with western influence to push the country towards revolution. Her 1981 Roots of Revolution: An Interpretative History of Modern Iran remains the seminal work on modern Iran. 59 American scholars have produced very polarizing interpretations in the post-revolution historiography. Barry Rubin’s Paved with Good Intentions argues that Washington believed that 57 Said Amir Arjomand, The Turban for the Crown: The Islamic Revolution in Iran (Oxford University Press, 1988). 58 These include Ervand Abrahamian, Iran Between Two Revolutions (Princeton University Press, 1982); Shaul Bakhash, The Reign of the Ayatollahs: Iran and the Islamic Revolution (New York: Basic Books, 1984); Homa Katouzian, The Political Economy of Modern Iran: Despotism and Pseudo-Modernism, 1926-1979 (New York University Press, 1981); and Roy Mottahedeh, The Mantle of the Prophet. 59 Nikki Keddie, Modern Iran: Roots of Revolution (Yale University Press, 1981). Keddie followed up her 1981 work by adding an analysis of the results of the revolution in her 2003 work Modern Iran: Roots and Results of Revolution. 19
Page 1 and 2: AN AUGURY OF REVOLUTION: THE IRANIA
Page 3 and 4: ABSTRACT The Iranian student moveme
Page 5 and 6: ACKNOWLEDGMENTS There are many peop
Page 7 and 8: DEDICATION This thesis is dedicated
Page 9 and 10: CHAPTER I - INTRODUCTION AND HISTOR
Page 11 and 12: a blank check to purchase any non-n
Page 13 and 14: and collective confrontation of ill
Page 15 and 16: The Iranian intelligentsia that bec
Page 17 and 18: man.” 20 More and more Iranians h
Page 19 and 20: developments took place during the
Page 21 and 22: 7,610 students. 39 James Bill ackno
Page 23 and 24: the potential to provide an alterna
Page 25: ole that the United States was assu
Page 29 and 30: Mosaddeq was soft on communism, res
Page 31 and 32: decade. Inequality, imperialism, co
Page 33 and 34: Iranian Students.” 77 Fereydoun H
Page 35 and 36: visit he made from the early 1960s
Page 37 and 38: Iranian general recalled that when
Page 39 and 40: epresented a wide variety of politi
Page 41 and 42: Iranian student protests in the ear
Page 43 and 44: government. 114 Information from th
Page 45 and 46: “Their message was clear: Don’t
Page 47 and 48: on six issues. Land reform was one
Page 49 and 50: Roosevelt of California. 143 Faribo
Page 51 and 52: a group of picketing Iranian studen
Page 53 and 54: progressive-mindedness that charact
Page 55 and 56: embarrassing to the United States G
Page 57 and 58: Throughout Kennedy’s presidency,
Page 59 and 60: of an impossible leader - - by enli
Page 61 and 62: The shah saw Iranian students abroa
Page 63 and 64: people. Show the Shah that you cond
Page 65 and 66: warned the Iranian students that th
Page 67 and 68: Iranian students under warning from
Page 69 and 70: people whether they were themselves
Page 71 and 72: unprecedented, with the exception o
Page 73 and 74: ecause they were active members and
Page 75 and 76: youth organizations such as the Fre
Page 77 and 78:
approchement with the Soviet Union
Page 79 and 80:
Iranian students in the United Stat
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condemnation of American imperialis
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quarterly publication of the ISAUS,
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States. When Bunting asked if the g
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the police used four water cannons
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With the trip postponed, the briefi
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diplomats in Tehran noted that they
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the modernization of education thre
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The shah made his last visit to the
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intimately involved in the U.S. cou
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CHAPTER IV - THE RADICALIZATION OF
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and networking with western student
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Marxists had taken place.” 393 Fo
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Demonstrations occurred in Iran tha
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agents in the Iranian Embassy in Wa
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student movement abroad was by far
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The group ended up receiving cots f
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were the result of high unemploymen
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egan to give the wrong people hairc
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opportunities for the CIS and well-
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with a group of Iranian students fr
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same day the lavish ceremonies were
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For the rest of the shah’s rule,
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question the nature of American inv
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over.” 499 As a result of a possi
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Even though Jimmy Carter used human
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augury stretched far beyond that on
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percent were inspired by communism.
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etaliatory response to the hostages
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did not desire the establishment of
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further radicalized the opposition.
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Douglas, William O. The Court Years
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Sick, Gary. All Fall Down: America
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Demonstrate: Tuesday, Sept. 1st, 4:
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SECONDARY SOURCES Abrahamian, Ervan
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Dixon, David and Shirin Hakimzadeh.
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Heineman, Kenneth J. Campus Wars: T
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McAlister, Melani. Epic Encounters:
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Von Dirke, Sabine. “All Power to
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(above) Figure 3. Ali Mohammad Fate
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(above) Figure 8. Heading of demons
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(above) Figure 12. Masked Iranian s
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(below) Figure16. Front page of ISA
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(left) Figure 19. The battle lines
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