03.02.2015 Views

AN AUGURY OF REVOLUTION: THE IRANIAN STUDENT ...

AN AUGURY OF REVOLUTION: THE IRANIAN STUDENT ...

AN AUGURY OF REVOLUTION: THE IRANIAN STUDENT ...

SHOW MORE
SHOW LESS

Create successful ePaper yourself

Turn your PDF publications into a flip-book with our unique Google optimized e-Paper software.

and collective confrontation of illegitimate authority,” in the 1960s were “unlikely to have much<br />

effect on American policy.” 6<br />

Iranian students did have an effect on American foreign policy in the early years of the<br />

1960s. Kennedy did not view the shah’s regime favorably, and many in the administration were<br />

receptive to the opinions of Iranian students in the United States. However, Lyndon Johnson<br />

drastically reversed the policies and attitudes of the Kennedy era, and the Nixon administration<br />

escalated the level of cooperation between Washington and Tehran that began during the<br />

Johnson administration. The decisions made by Richard Nixon and Henry Kissinger in May<br />

1972 were the culmination of an American policy toward Iran that had been developing for<br />

nearly a decade. Instead of a conservative reaction to the Iranian student movement, this policy<br />

was Realpolitik put into action. The Nixon administration viewed the world as a “single strategic<br />

theater” upon which it desired to forge alliances with world leaders that it believed would<br />

provide the best opportunities for American-defined stability. 7<br />

Washington believed that the<br />

shah could provide this stability, and ignored the plight of the citizens and students of Iran in<br />

favor of a ruler who supported American interests. The disconnect between the Iranian people<br />

and the shah led the Pahlavi regime to collapse with remarkable speed, increasing instability in<br />

the region that was to last into the twenty-first century.<br />

The Iranian student movement abroad was indicative of the growing unrest among the<br />

intelligentsia, but both Washington and Tehran downplayed its significance. Leaders in<br />

Washington and Tehran should have been aware of the historical role that the intelligentsia has<br />

played in the modern Middle East. There were thriving Ottoman exile communities in Paris and<br />

6 Maurice Isserman and Michael Kazin, America Divided: The Civil War of the 1960s (Oxford University Press,<br />

2004), 188.<br />

7 “The Modern World, A Single ‘Strategic Theater,’” 29 September 1969, attachment to Memorandum from<br />

Kissinger to Nixon, “A Strategic Overview,” undated, FRUS 1969 – 1976, Volume I, Foundations of Foreign Policy<br />

1969-1972 (Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 2003), 111.<br />

5

Hooray! Your file is uploaded and ready to be published.

Saved successfully!

Ooh no, something went wrong!