MULTIPLE IDENTITIES VIA SPIRITUALITY, HISTORIES AND CULTURAL RE-PRESENTATIONS 173Asian identity. Through its international relations andinteractions, Southeast Asia has developed regionalpatterns and characteristics, which help in recognizingits regional identity. In addition, this argument isimportant because, on the one hand, “the almostuniversal tendency of historians” has been “to focus onthe constituent parts of Southeast Asia rather than todevelop a perception of the region as a whole, as asuitable subject of study” (Legge 1992, 4-5). On theother hand, political scientists and security studieshave neglected the questions regarding whatconstitutes the components of the regions and whatmakes the region exist (Acharya 2000, 1).With the development of Southeast Asia itself and ofSoutheast Asian studies as a field of its own, a newapproach has emerged for studying Southeast Asia:that of approaching the region from interdisciplinaryperspectives such as history, anthropology,international relations, comparative politics, etc. Mostof these perspectives try to show the new importanceof the region and regionalism. Regionalism wasdeveloped over several different stages beginning withthe establishment of the Southeast Asia Command(SEAC) through inter-regional linkages within SEA,on to the creation of the first regional <strong>org</strong>anization.The new ways of thinking about regions andregionness that have emerged consist of both culturalhistorical,as well as political factors. If the first idea ofinter-regional linkages is represented by the concept ofthe Mandala state of O.W. Wolters (1999), 2 theresearch on “theatre state” of Clifford Geertz (1980), 3and the idea of “galactic polity” of Stanley Tambiah(1985), the second takes a look at the evolution ofregionalism as a product of interaction. Throughinteraction, regionalism and regionness can developnorms, standards, values, policies, <strong>org</strong>anization, andlast, but not least, identity. In this way, we can say thatidentity is socially constructed. 4The most successful political form that Southeast Asiahas thus far achieved is ASEAN way. The developmentof ASEAN represents a quest not only for an<strong>org</strong>anizational but also for a regional identity.According to Acharya: “Regions are sociallyconstructed, rather than geographically or ethnosociallypre-ordained. Southeast Asian regionnesscannot be established by simply looking at itsgeographic proximity or shared cultural attributes.Regions like nation-states are imagined communities”(Acharya 2000, 11).The formation of the ASEAN identityOn 8 August 1967, ASEAN was created in Bangkokwith the participation of Indonesia, Malaysia,Singapore, the Philippines, and Thailand. Althoughthe Bangkok Declaration stated that ASEAN is opento “all States in the South-East Asian regionsubscribing to the aims, principles and purposes”, it didnot define clear boundaries of the region itself.The motivation of the ASEAN foundation was notonly to “accelerate the economic growth, socialprogress and cultural development in the region,” butalso “to promote regional peace and stability”.Whether consciously or unconsciously, considerationsof national and regional security also figured largely inthe minds of the founders of the ASEAN. In fact, theimmediate motivation to form ASEAN was a commondesire of its members for collective action towardexternal powers. According to Prime Minister LeeKuan Yew (1978), the formation of ASEAN helpedthe members “to have their interests taken intoconsideration when great powers make theircompromises”. However, in comparison to externalthreats which could be considered differently, theASEAN members shared a common perception ofinternal threats. This was explained by the fear of thenational liberation movement in Vietnam, Laos, andCambodia, and by the communist insurgency alongthe border areas between Malaysia and Thailand, andbetween Malaysia and Indonesia. The agreementsregarding the common control of the border betweenThailand and Malaysia in 1959, Indonesia and thePhilippines in 1964 and between Indonesia andMalaysia in 1967 explained the strengthening of thebilateral security cooperation between ASEANmembers.The creation of ASEAN also marked tremendouschanges in the Southeast Asian environment. First,with its final abandonment of Konfrontasi(confrontation), the New Order regime of PresidentSuharto in Indonesia provided new impetus forregional integration. Second, since its separation fromthe Malaysian Federation in 1965, Singapore felt moresecure upon joining a regional <strong>org</strong>anization such asASEAN. Third, the other ASEAN members likeThailand, Malaysia, and the Philippines also sawASEAN as a tool for fostering and strengtheningmutual trust and understanding among its members.Fourth, the creation of ASEAN also reflected changesin the rivalry between big powers. In the second half ofThe Work of the 2010/2011 API Fellows
174 Panel 41960, the Soviet-China dispute and competition overSoutheast Asia became public and tense. Meanwhile,the détente and rapprochement in the relationshipbetween the US and the Soviet Union on the onehand, and between China and the US on the other,made countries in Southeast Asia worry that theirsecurity interests might be neglected or undermined.Fifth, the founding of ASEAN also reflected theregionalism trend in other parts of the world wherethree regional <strong>org</strong>anizations were born: theOrganization of American States (OAS), the ArabLeague, and the Organization of African Unity(OAU) in the 1970s. Last, but not least, the VietnamWar and American aid extended to ASEAN memberscontributed to the economic growth and security ofeach country, as well as of ASEAN as whole.Singapore, Malaysia and Thailand profited much fromthe situation and experienced their best economicperformance yet; the Philippines stagnated. Regardless,the common features of ASEAN economies were“uneven development, limited national integrationand plural societies” (Dixon 1991, 50). Thus, all ofthem, externally through WB and IMF, and internally,had to seek a close alliance among the state, foreignenterprises, and domestic capitalists in their efforts tofollow common economic policies such as economicliberalization and export-led development. Accordingto Acharya (2000, 90), “while rejecting a military rolefor ASEAN, its members hoped that politicalcooperation would create an atmosphere of stabilitywhich in turn would facilitate economic growth”.The birth of ASEAN, however, could not prevent themember states from experiencing conflicts. Very soonafter the creation of ASEAN, the association faced adispute over Sabah, between the Philippines andMalaysia, from April 1968 to December 1969. Thanksto diplomacy, measures, communication, and pressure,the foreign ministers during their meetings in Jakartain August and in Bangkok in December 1968, wereable to prevent the further escalation of the Sabahdispute which could have led to open armed conflictsand destroyed ASEAN. Moreover, the outcome of theSabah dispute provided ASEAN the impetus todevelop a new framework to build up a Zone of Peace,Freedom and Neutrality (ZOPFAN) in SoutheastAsia in 1971. The ZOPFAN idea emphasized theimportance of regional countries to “respect oneanother’s sovereignty and territorial integrity, and notparticipate in activities likely to directly or indirectlythreaten the security of another” (Ghazalie bin Shafie1971, 115). However, the ZOPFAN frameworkencountered difficulties in implementation due todisagreements among member states with regard to thepresence of the US in the region. A step forward in theestablishment of a regional cooperation was the Treatyof Amity and Cooperation (TAC) signed by memberstates at the First Summit in Bali, Indonesia in 1976.For the first time, the norms that formed the bases ofASEAN’s code of interstate behavior were signed.They included five fundamental principles: (i) mutualrespect for the independence, sovereignty, andterritorial integrity of all nations; (ii) the right of everystate to lead its national existence free from externalinterference, subversion, and coercion; (iii) noninterferencein the internal affairs of one another; (iv)settlement of differences and disputes by peacefulmeans; (v) renunciation of the threat of use of force(ASEAN Secretariat).The “ASEAN way” as core component of theASEAN identityBased on the main principles of TAC signed in 1976,despite challenges arising since its foundation,throughout its more than four decades of existence,ASEAN could prove to be a cohesive regional groupingwith a distinctive and effective approach to peace,stability, and development. This “soft approach” tointer-state relations among member states was calledthe “ASEAN way”. The ASEAN way consisted of a setof institutions inclusive of norms, principles, rules, anddecision- making procedures that were “softinstitutions”. These institutions were based onconvention and informal agreements rather thanformal treaties. Connors et al. (2004, 80) contend that“The pillar of ASEAN is voluntarism not legalism”.The roots of such informal mechanism and voluntaryprocedures for decision-making could be found in theMalay culture of “musyawarah” (consultation) and“mufakat” (consensus). These characteristics ofnegotiation are very common in Southeast Asiancountries including Vietnam.The ASEAN way of diplomacy in Southeast Asiaconsists of six norms including sovereign equality; thenon-recourse to the use of force and the peacefulsettlement of conflicts; non-interference and nonintervention;the non-involvement of ASEAN toaddress unresolved bilateral conflicts betweenmembers; quiet diplomacy; mutual respect andtolerance (Haacke 2003, 1). In fact, the ASEANemphasized quiet diplomacy and friendly negotiation.The Work of the 2010/2011 API Fellows
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CULTURE, POWER AND PRACTICES:THE GL
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viABOUT THE BOOKCULTURE, POWER AND
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viiiACKNOWLEDGEMENTSThe API Coordin
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x(co-authored with Gunawan Wiradi,
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OPENING REMARKS AND OVERVIEWDr. Rat
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249need to be looked at, as globali
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251Appendix IWorkshop ScheduleThe T
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25313:00 - 15:00 Concluding PanelCh
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255THAILANDAroon Puritat, Artist an
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257RAPPORTEURSGarry MorrisonMarian
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Communication, Education and Public
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261have used tourism as a mechanism
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263Panel 4: Multiple Modernities vi
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265out how Asian women politicians
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267CONTACT DETAILS (as of March 201