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MULTIPLE IDENTITIES VIA SPIRITUALITY, HISTORIES AND CULTURAL RE-PRESENTATIONS 177members. But the rise of China and its militarymodernization were very much causes for concernamong ASEAN countries, especially Vietnam, thePhilippines, Malaysia and Brunei that had sovereigntydisputes with it over the South China Sea. The othersix members of ASEAN preferred not to include theSouth China Sea issue in its agenda due to theirrelationship with the Mainland. Singapore,meanwhile, also shared the same concern, articulatedby one official thus: “Our worst fear is to get twosimultaneous phone calls, one from Washington andthe other from Beijing, asking us to take sides in aconflict” (Lampton 2008, 164). Faced by a risingChina, ASEAN should not consider it as a “threat”,but as a “possibility”, and therefore should continue toengage China to play a more positive, constructive andresponsible role in regional and world affairs.The ASEAN identity from the VietnameseperspectiveThe year 1995 marked a turning point in the history ofASEAN as well as in Vietnamese foreign policy, asVietnam became its seventh member. The relationshipbetween Vietnam and ASEAN transformed fromsuspicion and distrust, to cooperation. For Vietnam,this meant ending a long period of hostility rooted inthe Cold War. It also reflected a new environment forthe region where ideological confrontation wasreplaced by the sharing of a common interest in theregion’s peace, stability and prosperity. Along with itsrenovated open foreign policy, Vietnam expressed itswill to become a friend and reliable partner with allcountries in the world community striving for peace,cooperation, and friendship.Vietnam’s ASEAN membership also meant a newidentity for it because until the collapse of the SovietUnion in 1991, Vietnam had always acted as a memberof the communist bloc. Amidst the bipolar worldorder then, there was division between SoutheastAsian countries. The end of the Cold War ended thisdivision and brought ASEAN to a real regionalorganization. Joining ASEAN meant for Vietnam, acoming back home.Since joining ASEAN, Vietnam has followed andfulfilled all ASEAN policies pertaining to political,economic, as well as socio-cultural issues, inclusive ofsensitive problems of the other members. It wasVietnam’s very membership that hastened theacceptance of Laos and Myanmar to the ASEAN in1997 and Cambodia in 1999. One can easily concurwith the following statement: “Thus regionalism canperhaps be said to have become a part of Vietnam’sidentity building. I therefore emphasize the politicalnature of identity building, in contrast to those viewsthat emphasize the common cultural values behindregional identity” (Palmujoki 2007, 122). ForVietnam, the commitment to regional identity is aresult of the political search for a state identity afterthe Cold War (Nguyen 2002, 206-120).Besides the multiple gains Vietnam enjoyed from itsASEAN membership, ASEAN’s loose politicalstructure offered Vietnam a flexible instrument to helpmold its relationship with the region, as well as theexpression of its identity. This does not mean thatVietnamese officials have ignored the problems of theASEAN structure by emphasizing its national interestsin the regional organization. This dynamic also limitsthe use of ASEAN when Vietnam faces globalchallenges, such as dealing with and accession to theWTO.Whether its ASEAN membership has been asbeneficial to the conduct of Vietnam’s foreign affairs asis generally assumed, has yet to be discussed. DoesASEAN indeed present a continuous goldenopportunity for the management of Vietnam’sinternational relations; or would it be accurate for thecountry to view the Association as a golden cage, whichoffers clear opportunities in terms of the managementof the regional order while also increasingly restrictingVietnam’s foreign policy options? According to someauthors, in many ways, Vietnam has become one of thestrongest supporters of the traditional approach tointer-governmental cooperation, which ischaracterized by a strict adherence to consensusbuilding based on the lowest common denominator,non-binding decision-making, and non-interference(Dosch 2006, 236-237).Concluding RemarksThe history of ASEAN reflects a process of identitybuildingwhereby the regionalism of the 1970-1980sdeveloped by ASEAN provided Southeast Asia aregional identity. The post-Cold War period linkedwith the wider Asia-Pacific region, whose foundationwas laid by ASEAN. As expressed by, the outsiderSoutheast Asia became an organization of and for theregion.The Work of the 2010/2011 API Fellows
178 Panel 4Through its existence over four decades, ASEANcontributed to the region by maintaining regionalunity and preventing any serious internal conflicts, andby establishing regional autonomy and self-reliance.Despite its mixed impact on regional identity, throughparticipation in ASEAN, “the people of Southeast Asiahave come to accept as a matter of course theiridentification as Southeast Asian” (Andaya 1996).The lack of resources, the economic crisis, and the riseof China attest to ASEAN’s abilities and its future.Without financial resources and material capacities,however, a number of ASEAN activities and planscontinue to remain on paper.The unity and identity of ASEAN and Southeast Asiadepend much on the internal political will of memberstates, as well as on external factors such asglobalization and great power relations.NOTESAcharya, Amitav. 2000. The Quest for Identity – InternationalRelations of Southeast Asia. Oxford: Oxford University Press.Ahn, Ching-si. 1980. Forces of nationalism and economics inAsian regional co-operation. Asia Pacific Community, 7:106-18.Andaya, L.Y. 1996. Ethnonation, Nation-States andRegionalism in Southeast Asia. Proceedings of the InternationalSymposium “Southeast Asia: Global Area Studies for the 21 stCentury, Kyoto University 18-22 October.ASEAN Secretariat. 2010. ASEAN Vision 2020. Jakarta.ASEAN Secretariat. 2011. The ASEAN Charter. Jakarta.ASEAN Secretariat: www.aseansecretariat.orgBilahary, Kausikan. 2005. Small State’s Big Challenge to StayVital. Strait Times on September 2.Brewer, Marilynn and Wendi Gardner. 1996. Who Is This“We”? Levels of Collective Identity and Self Representations.Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 71 (1): 83-93.Campbell, Jennifer et al. 2000. Structural Features of the Self-Concept and Adjustment. Ed. A. Tesser, R. B. Felson, J.M. Suls(eds). Psychological Perspective on Self and Identity. WashingtonD.C.: American Psychological Association: 67-87.1234Interview of Author with Dr. Pranee Thiparat, Faculty ofPolitical Science, Chulalongkorn University, Bangkok onAugust 10, 2010.According to Wolters, the mandala was a state system inSoutheast Asia consisting of overlapping “circles of king”.Under the mandala system, the authority of the king was lessdirect and absolute. There were three circles in centerperipheryrelations. While the center was under the directcontrol of the king, the second surrounding circle was ruledby princes or governors. The third circle was made up oftributary states and remained mostly independent.In “the theatre state” of Geertz, there was no single state thatpossessed the power of hegemony over the others. Instead,the states shared power with dozens of independent or semiindependentstates.Interview of Author with Prof. Dewi Fortuna Anwar,Advisor to Vice President of Indonesia in Jakarta, on January2011.Cerny, Philip. 2006. Plurality, pluralism and power: Element ofpluralist analysis in an age of globalization. In Socio-PoliticalPluralism, Pluralism: Developments in the Theory and Practice ofDemocracy, ed. Reiner Esifeld, No. 16: 81-111.Connors, Michael K. et al. 2004. The New Global Politics of theAsia-Pacific. London and New York: RoutledgeCurzon, Taylor& Francis Group.Dixon, C. 1991. South East Asia in the World Economy: ARegional Geography. London: Cambridge University Press.Deutsch, Karl. 1957. Political Community and the NorthAtlantic Area. Princeton: Princeton University Press.Dosch, Joern. 2006. Vietnam’s ASEAN Membership: GoldenOpportunity or Golden Cage? Contemporary Southeast AsiaVol. 28, No2: 234-58.Geertz, Clifford. 1980. Negara: The Theatre State inNineteenth-Century Bali. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton UniversityPress.REFERENCESAbrams, Dominic and Hogg Michael (eds). 1999. Social Identityand Social Cognition. Oxford: Blackwell.Acharya, Amitav. 1997. Ideas, Identity, and Institution-Building: From “ASEAN Way” to the Asia-Pacific Way? ThePacific Review 10: 319-346.Ghazalie bin Shafie M. 1971. The Neutralization of SoutheastAsia. Pacific Community. October: 110-125.Haacke, Juergend. 2003. ASEAN’s Diplomatic and SecurityCulture: Origins, Development and Prospects. London:RoutledgeCurzon.Hecht, Michael L et al. 2005. A Communication Theory ofIdentity, Development, Theoretical Perspective, and FutureThe Work of the 2010/2011 API Fellows
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CULTURE, POWER AND PRACTICES:THE GL
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viABOUT THE BOOKCULTURE, POWER AND
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viiiACKNOWLEDGEMENTSThe API Coordin
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x(co-authored with Gunawan Wiradi,
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xiiSri Wahyuni is the director of t
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xivThe gap between rich and poor is
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xviand development mainly: Economy,
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xviiiIn closing, I would like to qu
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xxmovements to defend their rights,
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xxiicomplex relationships between f
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xxivIndonesian Academy of Social Sc
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MULTIPLE MODERNITIES: GLOBALIZATION
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POTENTIAL OF LOCAL KNOWLEDGE AND PR
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58 Panel 2(Left) Kurazukuri are anc
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OPENING REMARKS AND OVERVIEWDr. Rat
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247There is also a massive movement
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249need to be looked at, as globali
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251Appendix IWorkshop ScheduleThe T
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25313:00 - 15:00 Concluding PanelCh
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255THAILANDAroon Puritat, Artist an
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257RAPPORTEURSGarry MorrisonMarian
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Communication, Education and Public
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261have used tourism as a mechanism
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263Panel 4: Multiple Modernities vi
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265out how Asian women politicians
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267CONTACT DETAILS (as of March 201
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