Untitled - Api-fellowships.org

MULTIPLE IDENTITIES VIA SPIRITUALITY, HISTORIES AND CULTURAL RE-PRESENTATIONS 175“Musyawarah”, as explained by a former IndonesianForeign Minister, means a setting in which negotiationwould be considered “not as between opponents but asbetween friends and brothers” (Acharya 2000, 128).As members of a family, the ASEAN countries havenever used Articles 13 to 17 under Chapter IV ofTAC, in the settlement of disputes. According to thisTreaty, whenever there are disputes among countries,there will be a High Council consisting of aministerial-level representative from each memberstate that will take appropriate measures andencourage direct negotiations for a peacefulsettlement. However, until now, the ASEAN membershave never called a meeting of the High Council,though there had been a number of disputes amongthem. Almost all disputes among ASEAN memberswere solved in an informal way, without resorting toformal, multilateral measures.The other example of the ASEAN way of informalitywas its relatively small bureaucratic apparatus reflectedin the ASEAN Secretariat in Jakarta, although therehave been about 700 meetings of different levels ofASEAN officials.Despite the fact that ASEAN had had to adapt to anew environment and situation by issuing legalisticdocuments, “soft regionalism” based on consultationand consensus remained the most important norm forASEAN.The six norms mentioned above provide the basis forfour main principles of ASEAN. The first principle is“open regionalism” which means avoidance ofdiscrimination among intra and extra regional actors,mutual commitments, and non-exclusive ordermaintenance. The second principle is “cooperativesecurity” which means the opposite of a military blocthat implies exclusive membership, non-interference,respect for national identity, and territorial integrity.“Soft rule” is the third principle which means a nonlegalisticapproach to cooperation, a looseorganizational structure, non-binding decisionmaking,networks, and the absence of any supranationalagencies. The last principle is “consensusbuilding” which means moving forward by establishingbroad support (Acharya 1997).Despite the success of the ASEAN way, it faced a lot ofcritics. According to Estrella Solidum (1974) from thePhilippines, the cooperation among ASEAN memberswould be more realistic and successful if it dealt with“safe” or non-sensitive issues. Because of theheterogeneous polities of ASEAN members, suchmatters of high politics like the establishment ofmilitary alliances or common markets would not besuitable to the early phase of cooperation. Malaysianexpert Pushpa Thambipillai (1980) presented thepoint that ASEAN countries would not follow theprocess of community building as Karl Deutsch (1957)prescribed, not striving to build political communitywhenever there is according to Deutsch (1957, 6):“formal merger of two or more previously independentunits into a single larger unit, with some type ofcommon government after amalgamation”, but wouldprefer to preserve their own autonomy. Consequently,although the level and scope of interdependenceamong ASEAN members had been increasing, themember states of ASEAN still try to maintain theirown identities by supporting the principle of noninterferencein internal affairs.The most important explanation for the obstaclesencountered in the course of building a commonidentity would be the historical burdens. According toKorean expert Ching-si Ahn (1980), the explanationbehind the slow process of regionalism of SoutheastAsia could be found in its bitter memories ofcolonialism and the Second World War. ASEANmembers are very reluctant to give up their sovereigntyand independence, the achievement of which entaileda long, tough battle. The ASEAN secretariat continuesnot to make any decisions for or on behalf of itsmember states.Until the outbreak of the Asian financial crisis in1997, there had been a strong belief in the ASEANway of informal, soft, non-binding procedures. Thenthe crisis showed how ineffectively ASEAN wasworking and thus put an end to the procedures ofASEAN ideal model of development before depressionand disintegration could set in. There were differentpoints of view regarding this development, but onething was clear: ASEAN lacked the economicresources and the institutional mechanisms to dealwith the financial crisis. The third point of view sawthe crisis as a chance for ASEAN to revitalize its spiritby developing new mechanisms of cooperation forAsia-Pacific and sub-regional levels like the ASEANPlus Three Forum.Following the crisis, Thailand, with the support of thePhilippines, proposed that ASEAN’s non-interferenceprinciple should be replaced by so-called “flexibleengagement”. This idea was, however, not accepted bymajority of ASEAN members, but was neverthelessThe Work of the 2010/2011 API Fellows