12.07.2015 Views

US Government Debt Different - Finance Department - University of ...

US Government Debt Different - Finance Department - University of ...

US Government Debt Different - Finance Department - University of ...

SHOW MORE
SHOW LESS

You also want an ePaper? Increase the reach of your titles

YUMPU automatically turns print PDFs into web optimized ePapers that Google loves.

Richard SquireCDS on <strong>US</strong>A and Correlation-Seeking83There is a type <strong>of</strong> investment strategy that, counter-intuitively, couldmake firms whose insolvency risk is highly correlated with that <strong>of</strong> the<strong>US</strong> Treasury more likely to sell CDS on <strong>US</strong>A. This strategy, whichelsewhere I have termed “correlation-seeking,” 37 is a form <strong>of</strong> debtoropportunism in which a firm’s managers use contingent liabilities—such as those created by CDS—to transfer value from the firm’sunsecured creditors to its shareholders. 38 Correlation-seeking in themarket for CDS on <strong>US</strong>A could cause the contracts to be underpricedand the liability risk to be over-concentrated. To date, there is nodirect evidence that correlation-seeking is occurring in this market.But the likelihood that the solvency <strong>of</strong> many large financial institutionsis tied to that <strong>of</strong> the <strong>US</strong> Treasury suggests that correlationseekingis nonetheless a hazard, and that regulators should monitorfor signs <strong>of</strong> its emergence.In general terms, correlation-seeking occurs when a firm sells contingentclaims against itself whose risk <strong>of</strong> being triggered is stronglycorrelated with the firm’s insolvency risk. The fees collected from thesales enrich the firm’s shareholders as long as the firm remains solvent.And if conditions arise that cause the contingent liabilities tobe triggered, the high likelihood that the firm will then be insolventmeans that the liabilities will probably be borne not by the shareholders,but rather by the firm’s general creditors, whose recoveriesin the insolvency proceeding will thereby be diluted. To be sure, thefees collected from the sales may be part <strong>of</strong> the firm’s estate and hencemay augment creditor recoveries. But it can be shown as a matter<strong>of</strong> simple arithmetic that the fees will be inadequate to <strong>of</strong>fset theexpected dilutive impact on unsecured creditors as long as the firm’sinsolvency risk and the contingency risk are positively correlated. 39In this way, the sales <strong>of</strong> the contingent claims transfer expected valuefrom the firm’s general creditors to its shareholders. Unsecured credi-37 Richard Squire, Shareholder Opportunism in a World <strong>of</strong> Risky <strong>Debt</strong>, 123 Harv. L.Rev. 1151 (2010).38 A simple and prevalent example <strong>of</strong> correlation-seeking occurs when a parentcorporation issues a guarantee on the debt <strong>of</strong> a subsidiary whose equity is among theparent’s primary assets. See Richard Squire, Strategic Liability in the Corporate Group,78 U. Chi. L. Rev. 605 (2011).39 See Squire, note 37 above, at 1159.

Hooray! Your file is uploaded and ready to be published.

Saved successfully!

Ooh no, something went wrong!