12.07.2015 Views

US Government Debt Different - Finance Department - University of ...

US Government Debt Different - Finance Department - University of ...

US Government Debt Different - Finance Department - University of ...

SHOW MORE
SHOW LESS

You also want an ePaper? Increase the reach of your titles

YUMPU automatically turns print PDFs into web optimized ePapers that Google loves.

Charles W. Mooney, Jrin subpart B if the consensual bilateral or trilateral restructuring arrangementswere declined.179Bilateral negotiations would present yet another set <strong>of</strong> problems. Asa general matter it makes some sense for a distressed debtor to sitdown with major creditors to discuss the debtor’s situation, alternatives,and proposed solutions. But in the case <strong>of</strong> sovereign debt heldby other sovereigns, political issues and concerns may flow from anddominate the purely economic considerations. For example, the secondand third largest government holders <strong>of</strong> U.S. debt, Japan and theUnited Kingdom, 13 are states with which the U.S. has close ties andvery friendly relations. The largest such holder, China, 14 is a powerfulrival with which the U.S. aspires to have a stable and friendlyrelationship. 15 Would these governments view a restructuring planthat targets their holdings as a repudiation <strong>of</strong> these relationships oreven as a hostile act akin to a blockade or boycott? Of course, theidentities <strong>of</strong> the holders <strong>of</strong> U.S. Treasuries could change dramaticallyfollowing a period such as that described in the fictional scenario inPart II or under any scenario that would give rise to the need for theU.S. to restructure its debt. But the concerns as to the political effectswould be relevant regardless <strong>of</strong> the identities <strong>of</strong> the largest governmentalholders <strong>of</strong> U.S. debt.Difficulties notwithstanding, bilateral restructuring negotiations maybe the only feasible alternative. The two most attractive restructuringapproaches discussed in subpart B depend on the legal discharge andsatisfaction <strong>of</strong> a portion <strong>of</strong> non-exempted Treasury obligations or on13 See Major Holders, supra note 9.14 See id.15 One op-ed author proposed that the U.S. should abandon its alliance with Taiwanin exchange for China forgiving the U.S. debt that it holds. Paul V. Kane, ToSave our Economy, Ditch Taiwan, N.Y. Times, Nov. 10, 2011 at A35. The suggestionwas met with a flurry <strong>of</strong> on-line opposition. See, e.g., On Paul V. Kane and HisStupid Op-Ed, The China Hotline (Nov. 12, 2011), available at http://thechinahotline.wordpress.com/2011/11/12/on-paul-v-kane-and-his-stupid-op-ed/;DitchingTaiwan to save U.S. Economy will be Myopic, Naïve, Asian Conservatives (Nov. 11,2011), available at http://asianconservatives.com/economy/ditching-taiwan-tosave-u-s-economy-will-be-myopic-naive/;Joshua Keating, Decline Watch: Can wesave America by ditching Taiwan?, Passport (Nov. 11, 2011), available at http://blog.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2011/11/11/decline_watch_can_we_save_america_by_ditching_taiwan.

Hooray! Your file is uploaded and ready to be published.

Saved successfully!

Ooh no, something went wrong!