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US Government Debt Different - Finance Department - University of ...

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Howell E. JacksonWhile assertions <strong>of</strong> inherent Executive authority raise deep and unsettledquestions <strong>of</strong> law, I am dubious that Treasury <strong>Department</strong> <strong>of</strong>ficialsare likely to resort to these theories to ignore entirely a congressionallyimposed debt ceiling in the face <strong>of</strong> a Phase Two <strong>Debt</strong>Ceiling crisis. The government <strong>of</strong>ficials who manage the public debtand would be required to defend their actions before Congress in thewake <strong>of</strong> a constitutional confrontation live and work within a system<strong>of</strong> well-defined rules and external controls. For personnel fromthe Office <strong>of</strong> Fiscal Service to invoke vague and untested theories<strong>of</strong> Executive Supremacy would require a considerable leap <strong>of</strong> faithinto unfamiliar and uncomfortable territory. Moreover, unlike othercontexts where the Executive has invoked emergency powers – covertoperations and other matters <strong>of</strong> national security – debt ceiling crisesare played out in the public eye and reactions to unilateral Executiveaction would provoke immediate and hostile responses. Finally,in the face <strong>of</strong> such controversies, one cannot be at all clear that thecapital markets would find palatable the purchase <strong>of</strong> public debt issuedin the absence <strong>of</strong> express congressional authorization. Whetherthat debt would be supported by the full faith and credit <strong>of</strong> the U.S.government and the implications for the secondary market pricing<strong>of</strong> previously issued government debt are imponderables that wouldfurther discourage most Treasury <strong>Department</strong> <strong>of</strong>ficials from venturingtoo deeply down the rabbit hole <strong>of</strong> inherent Executive powers.61B. Systems <strong>of</strong> Spending PrioritizationBut if the Executive is unlikely to ignore the debt ceiling completely,how might it go about resolving an imbalance <strong>of</strong> expenditures andrevenues in the face <strong>of</strong> a Phase Two <strong>Debt</strong> Crisis? In other words, ifthe government did lack sufficient cash resources to pay all <strong>of</strong> its billsas they came due, how might its available cash be allocated? A number<strong>of</strong> approaches are possible. 61. FIFO and Other Mechanical ApproachesPerhaps the most commonly suggested approach to dealing with aPhase Two Crisis is a mechanical, “First in, First Out (FIFO)” rule,whereby the government simply pays its bills as they are received.6 A more detailed discussion <strong>of</strong> these possibilities appears in Part II <strong>of</strong> Appendix A.

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