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US Government Debt Different - Finance Department - University of ...

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212 United States Sovereign <strong>Debt</strong>: A Thought Experiment On Default And Restructuringetary policy. A decision not to print money is as much an exerciseover monetary policy as a contrary decision. As in Perry, under Alternative2, the exercise by Congress <strong>of</strong> its power over monetary policywould leave non-exempt Treasury holders with less than the full benefit<strong>of</strong> their bargains. As in Perry, however, this result would preventSection Four and the non-abrogation principle from overriding thepower over monetary policy.The discussion <strong>of</strong> Alternative 2 to this point has focused on the validity<strong>of</strong> the U.S. obligations, which Alternative 2 would not purportto affect. But the constitutionality <strong>of</strong> Alternative 2 also mustbe tested from another perspective that arises out <strong>of</strong> the sovereignnature <strong>of</strong> Treasuries. Certainly, holders <strong>of</strong> Treasuries have civil contractualclaims based on the U.S. obligations to pay. But arguablythey may have more than a contractual claim to the extent that U.S.law requires (other than by virtue <strong>of</strong> contractual obligation) the U.S.to pay. Current law provides with respect to Treasuries:(a) The faith <strong>of</strong> the United States <strong>Government</strong> is pledged to pay,in legal tender, principal and interest on the obligations <strong>of</strong> the<strong>Government</strong> issued under this chapter.(b) The Secretary <strong>of</strong> the Treasury shall pay interest due or accruedon the public debt. As the Secretary considers expedient,the Secretary may pay in advance interest on the public debt bya period <strong>of</strong> not more than one year, with or without a rebate <strong>of</strong>interest on the coupons. 125Subsection (a) does not directly require payment <strong>of</strong> principal, butthat requirement might be implicit in “pledged to pay.” Certainly,subsection (a) would authorize payment. Subsection (b) does directlyrequire payment. Should these provisions, which are directedat the U.S. government, also be considered a part <strong>of</strong> the U.S. obligationsto Treasury holders? Stated otherwise, are Treasury holderslegal beneficiaries <strong>of</strong> these provisions? If so, then if Alternative 2 wereimplemented by a law that partially abrogated these provisions, thatmight well question the public debt and violate the non-abrogationprincipal.125 31 U.S.C. § 3123(a), (b).

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