12.07.2015 Views

US Government Debt Different - Finance Department - University of ...

US Government Debt Different - Finance Department - University of ...

US Government Debt Different - Finance Department - University of ...

SHOW MORE
SHOW LESS

Create successful ePaper yourself

Turn your PDF publications into a flip-book with our unique Google optimized e-Paper software.

288The 2011 <strong>Debt</strong> Limit Impasse: Treasury’s Actions & The Counterfactual – What Might Have Happened if the National <strong>Debt</strong> Hit the Statutory LimitPr<strong>of</strong>essor Tribe argues that the President would have the authority toprioritize spending if the national debt hit the statutory limit because(1) the existing revenue sources would not allow the President t<strong>of</strong>ulfill all spending obligations and (2) he does not have the power toraise revenues without congressional authorization. 209 As a result, thePresident’s only option would be to cut spending in order to avoida breach <strong>of</strong> the debt limit or the rules <strong>of</strong> the tax code. According toPr<strong>of</strong>essor Tribe, the President may be under some constraints whenhe chooses which obligations to prioritize. Importantly, the spirit <strong>of</strong>the impoundment crisis and its legal backlash provide an implicitprohibition against prioritizing obligations for political allies. 210Prioritization is a de facto choice to not fulfill some appropriatedobligations; therefore, the President may be able to justify temporaryprioritization by using the rescission or deferral provisions <strong>of</strong> theImpoundment Control Act. 211 When a spending obligation comesdue that the President does not want to pay, he may propose torescind the obligation. 212 Congress would then have forty-five daysto pass a rescission bill; otherwise, the President must fulfill theobligation. Thus, even if Congress does not pass a rescission bill, therescission proposal could buy the President forty-five days until hemust spend the undesired allotment. 213 The deferral provisions <strong>of</strong> theAct would permit the President to defer spending obligations untilthe end <strong>of</strong> the fiscal year. 214 However, the President would have toshow that the deferral proposal fits into one <strong>of</strong> the three permittedpurposes stated in the Act: “(1) to provide for contingencies; (2) toachieve savings made possible by or through changes in requirementsor greater efficiency <strong>of</strong> operations; or (3) as specifically provided bylaw.” 215If the President attempted to achieve prioritization through deferral,he would likely seek to justify it as a provision for “contingencies”lawresources/antideficiencybackground.html). See also Levit et al. supra note 171, at 8.209See Tribe, supra note 144. See also supra Theory I.A – The President is Bound by the <strong>Debt</strong>Limit.210See id.211See Levit, et al., supra note 171, at 8-9.212See 2 U.S.C. § 683(a) (1987).213See 2 U.S.C. § 683(b) (1987).2142 U.S.C. § 684(b) (1987).215Id.

Hooray! Your file is uploaded and ready to be published.

Saved successfully!

Ooh no, something went wrong!