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US Government Debt Different - Finance Department - University of ...

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294The 2011 <strong>Debt</strong> Limit Impasse: Treasury’s Actions & The Counterfactual – What Might Have Happened if the National <strong>Debt</strong> Hit the Statutory Limiton government bonds, 251 leaving $148 billion in inflows to pay$276 billion in obligations. 252 Presumably, the remainder <strong>of</strong> theseobligations would have been made using a FIFO approach. 253Notably, protecting from technical default alone may not have beensufficient to prevent a negative market reaction, especially in light <strong>of</strong>the CDS definition <strong>of</strong> “credit event,” which includes failure to payany “obligation.” 254Theory 2B: The President Must Prioritize Bondholder PaymentsStatus <strong>of</strong> Funds utilizedduring DISPInterest Payments toBondholders(Aug. 2 – Aug. 31)Mandatory Spending onEntitlements(Aug. 2 – Aug. 31)AppropriatedDiscretionary Spending(Aug. 2 – Aug. 31)Proportion <strong>of</strong> totalexpenses paid Aug. 2 –Aug. 31Outstanding <strong>Debt</strong> onAug. 31DISP likely would have been extended; Fundswould not have been made whole on Aug. 2Paid, as scheduled ($38 billion) 255With no authority to prioritize, entitlementswould likely be subject to a FIFO payment schemeWith no authority to prioritize, discretionaryexpenseswould likely be subject to a FIFOpayment scheme59% (54% <strong>of</strong> non-interest expenses) 256$14.294 trillion, as approved in Feb. 2010legislation251Treasury Direct, supra note 199.252Id.253See supra Theory 1. Prioritizing interest would have presented a unique difficulty under aFIFO approach in that $32 billion was due to be paid on Aug. 15. Inflows from that day alonewould have been insufficient to make such a payment. Therefore, funds would have to havebeen set-aside in advance, prioritizing a future payment over payments already due.254See Austin & Miller, supra note 245 at 11-12; see also International Swaps and DerivativesAssociation, CDS on <strong>US</strong> Sovereign <strong>Debt</strong> Q&A, http://www2.isda.org/news/cds-on-ussovereign-debt-qampa.“A CDS is triggered when a Credit Event occurs. There are three CreditEvents that are typically used for Sovereigns such as the United States. They are: Failure to Pay;Repudiation/Moratorium and Restructuring . . . . ‘Failure to Pay means, after the expiration <strong>of</strong>any applicable Grace Period . . . . the failure by a Reference Entity to make, when and wheredue, any payments in an aggregate amount <strong>of</strong> not less that the Payment requirement underone or more Obligations, in accordance with the terms <strong>of</strong> such Obligation at the time <strong>of</strong> suchfailure.’” (emphasis added). The grace period for U.S. CDS is 3 days. The U.S. CDS marketis relatively small, and exposures are limited, so the triggering <strong>of</strong> CDS alone would not be alarge threat to the economy at this time. However, if the U.S. CDS market grows, or if thebroader market is afflicted with contagion concerns upon a triggering event, the danger to theU.S. economy could be large, despite continued payment on the reference entity (Treasurysecurities).

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