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US Government Debt Different - Finance Department - University of ...

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246 Direct and Indirect U.S. <strong>Government</strong> <strong>Debt</strong>to revenues. At the same time, it arguably would be more constitutionallypermitted than reducing the principal amount, 2 especially ifthe extended maturities accrue interest at a market rate so that, economically,there would be no “actual loss.” 3 Extending debt maturitieswould also be less politically and commercially disruptive thanreducing the principal amount, because the debt would eventuallybe honored.Pr<strong>of</strong>. Mooney may wish to compare the ability <strong>of</strong> large Treasuriesholders to quickly exit the market with the increasing corporatedebt-restructuring problem caused by distressed-debt trading. Notonly are large investors able to quickly divest their claims, at a discountedprice. More significantly, buyers <strong>of</strong> those claims <strong>of</strong>ten includeopportunistic investors, such as hedge funds, who increasinglyhave been trying to “game” the system for short-term advantage. Thishas been undermining some <strong>of</strong> the long-term debtor restructuringgoals <strong>of</strong> the federal Bankruptcy Code. 4Regarding post-default enforcement <strong>of</strong> Treasuries, Pr<strong>of</strong>. Mooney’spaper observes that the <strong>of</strong>fering circular for Treasuries provides, withrespect to the commercial book-entry system, that the federal governmentdoes not “have any obligation to any person or entity thatdoes not have an account with a Federal Reserve Bank.” But querywhether that restriction might itself be unconstitutional because it“questions” enforceability <strong>of</strong> the debt. Moreover, if that restrictionwere held to be unconstitutional, at least two additional questionswould arise: Would investors be deemed to, and could they even,waive the unconstitutionality?I am not convinced, as is Pr<strong>of</strong>. Mooney, that default should be equatedwith invalidity. Section Four <strong>of</strong> the Fourteenth Amendment providesthat the “validity <strong>of</strong> the public debt <strong>of</strong> the United States . . .shall not be questioned.” 5 Pr<strong>of</strong>. Mooney observes that the plurality2 Cf. infra note 5 and accompanying text.3 Perry v. United States, 294 U.S. 330, 358 (1935).4 See Harvey Miller, Keynote Address: Bankruptcy And Reorganization, Through TheLooking Glass Of 50 Years (1960 – 2010), presented March 12, 2012, at the annualInduction <strong>of</strong> Fellows <strong>of</strong> the American College <strong>of</strong> Bankruptcy, United States SupremeCourt, at 12-13 (expressing concern over distressed-debt trading).5 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, §4.

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