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214 United States Sovereign Debt: A Thought Experiment On Default And Restructuringdecision to default would in fact and law contravene the directivesto pay in section 3123, so Alternative 2 would require Congress toprovide an exception.Notwithstanding the forgoing textual analysis distinguishing validityfrom default and the analysis of Section 3123(a) and (b) justadvanced, defenders of Alternative 2’s constitutionality would facean arguable flaw in these arguments. Although Alternative 2 wouldleave holders of non-exempted Treasuries with precisely the same legalentitlements vis-à-vis the U.S. as would have existed prior to itsimplementation, the actual judicial enforcement of Treasuries againstthe U.S. has never been a realistic expectation. Instead, confidence inthe payment—and value—of Treasuries has been based on the “faithof the United States Government” 127 and the “contractual obligation. . . [that], despite infirmities of procedure, remains binding uponthe conscience of the sovereign.” 128 This seems to be the kernel of theargument advanced by Abramowicz and Balkin that legal validitywith the prospect of nonpayment in fact violates Section Four. 129 Buta contrary conclusion is also plausible, as discussed above. NeitherSection Four nor the non-abrogation principle provides a positivecommand that the U.S. pay its obligations or a prohibition againstnonpayment. The framers of Section Four might have chosen thatapproach but they did not. Section Four also does not condition thepower of the government upon making a payment or giving othervalue as does the Fifth Amendment. 130 The non-exempted Treasurieswould be valid obligations of the U.S. both before and after implementationof Alternative 2. Every day, obligors on valid obligationsdefault and no one has ever thought such obligations are therebyinvalidated. Finally, recall once again the holding in Perry. Notwithstandingthe unconstitutionality of the attempt by Congress to abrogatethe U.S. obligations under gold clauses, the Court allowed thede facto invalidation to stand. 131Given the working assumption of cooperative U.S. courts in a financialcrisis, the ultimate constitutionality of Alternative 2 is plausible.127 31 U.S.C. § 3123(a).128 Perry, 294 U.S. at 354.129 See text at notes 108-115, supra.130 U.S. Const. amend. V (quoted in part supra note 90).131 See text at notes 39-42, supra.