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US Government Debt Different - Finance Department - University of ...

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Zoltan Pozsartions, forming an integral cog <strong>of</strong> Asia’s mercantilist policies, shiftedtheir manufacturing activities to low-cost economies. Meanwhiletheir consumer base in developed markets embarked on a debt-fueledconsumption boom. These dynamics drove a secular expansionin corporate pr<strong>of</strong>its, and led to the emergence <strong>of</strong> large, global corporationsas net funding providers in the financial ecosystem. Third,given the problem <strong>of</strong> underfunded pensions and paltry returns beforethe crisis, real money accounts allocated an ever larger share <strong>of</strong>their portfolios to levered investment strategies. This drove the secularexpansion <strong>of</strong> the hedge fund complex as providers <strong>of</strong> levered investmentreturns. Hedge funds’ long-short equity, fixed income arbitrageand derivatives-based investment strategies drove an expansionin securities lending, securities financing and risk intermediation,respectively, each <strong>of</strong> which raised the cash intensity <strong>of</strong> the systemfor collateral and liquidity management purposes (see Pozsar, 2010).37Institutional cash investors’ cash balances—or institutional cashpools—are very large. Just before the financial crisis, they averaged$400 billion for <strong>of</strong>ficial accounts, over $75 billion for securities lenders,$50 billion for asset managers, and $25 billion for the most cashrich<strong>of</strong> global corporations. These average sizes were far above precrisisdeposit insurance limits <strong>of</strong> $100,000.Institutional cash investors were challenged in trying to place theirfunds into safe, short-term liquid instruments or in instruments that<strong>of</strong>fer guaranteed liquidity on demand and at par. They had three basictypes <strong>of</strong> instruments to choose from: (1) government guaranteedinstruments; (2) secured, privately guaranteed instruments; and (3)unsecured, unguaranteed instruments. These instruments representthe liabilities <strong>of</strong> the sovereign, the shadow banking system and traditionalbanks. <strong>Government</strong> guaranteed instruments include U.S.Treasury bills, Agency discount notes (or short-term paper issuedby the housing GSEs) and insured deposits. Secured, privately guaranteedinstruments include repurchase agreements and asset-backedcommercial paper issued by broker-dealers and the now defunct SIVsand conduits, respectively. Unsecured instruments were uninsureddeposits and commercial paper issued mainly by banks. Institutionalcash investors held these instruments either directly or indirectly viamoney funds.

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