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US Government Debt Different - Finance Department - University of ...

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Charles W. Mooney, Jrcontext <strong>of</strong> bankruptcy provides a strong rebuttal <strong>of</strong> arguments thatthe exercise by Congress <strong>of</strong> its powers under the Bankruptcy Clause,even if prospective, is immune from attack as an unconstitutionaltaking. 92 Thomas Plank has reached the same conclusion. 93203There would seem to be little question that the powers <strong>of</strong> Congressunder the Bankruptcy Clause must yield to the Takings Clause. It is afundamental constitutional principal that the general powers grantedto Congress in the Constitution, including the Bankruptcy Clause,are subject to the Bill <strong>of</strong> Rights. 94 Surprisingly, however, scholarswho have debated the issue have failed to take note <strong>of</strong> this general,overarching principle. In his thoughtful and thorough article, forexample, James Rogers acknowledged and proceeded to rebut theprevailing view at the time that legislation under the BankruptcyClause is subject to the Takings Clause. 95 But neither Rogers nor Forresterexplicitly took note <strong>of</strong> this general principle which appears tobe dispositive <strong>of</strong> the question. Even so, it is doubtful that Alternative1 would present an unconstitutional taking. If the Prosperity Sharesdistribution would pass muster under a Chapter 9-like best intereststest, discussed above, that should constitute “just compensation” asit would under Chapter 9 itself.The downside <strong>of</strong> implementing Alternative 1 through a sovereignbankruptcy regime is the involvement <strong>of</strong> a court. Even if handled bynonjudicial administrators, a system <strong>of</strong> appeals no doubt would bea necessary element <strong>of</strong> the system. That necessarily provides a forumfor non-exempted Treasuries holders to attack the constitutionality<strong>of</strong> the scheme through a challenge to the scope <strong>of</strong> the BankruptcyClause or otherwise.92 Forrester, supra note 90, at 854, 871-72, 885, 905, 911-12.93 Plank, supra, note 90, at 1090 n.106.94 See, e.g., John E. Nowak & Ronald D. Rotunda, Constitutional Law 208 (7thed. 2004) (“The commerce power, like all other federal powers, is subject to the restrictions<strong>of</strong> the Bill <strong>of</strong> Rights and other fundamental constitutional guarantees.”); 1Tribe, American Constitutional Law 851 (3d ed. 2000) (“There are, however, otherlimits on those [congressional] powers . . . One obvious example is the Bill <strong>of</strong> Rights,which forbids measures that might otherwise be thought to fall within Congress’Article I powers (e.g., prohibiting those engaged in commerce from speaking onpolitical subjects).”).95 Rogers, supra note 91

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