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US Government Debt Different - Finance Department - University of ...

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Concluding ThoughtsHowell E. Jackson67One <strong>of</strong> the paradoxes <strong>of</strong> debt ceiling crises is that the part <strong>of</strong> thegovernment best equipped to engage in advance planning for theconduct <strong>of</strong> government business in a Phase Two <strong>Debt</strong> Crisis hasstrong political incentives to avoid any public discussion <strong>of</strong> sensibleplanning procedures. In the months and weeks leading up to a debtceiling crisis, the Executive’s primary goal is to force congressionalcompromises by suggesting that the consequences <strong>of</strong> failing to raisethe public debt ceiling will be unpredictable and unpalatable to awide range <strong>of</strong> important constituencies. However, should the debtceiling ever actually be reached and should a Phase Two <strong>Debt</strong> Crisisensue, the incentives <strong>of</strong> the Executive will transform overnight.Rather than raising the specter <strong>of</strong> dire consequences, the focus <strong>of</strong>government policy would then be to convey to the general publicand the capital markets that a prudent, legally-defensible, andeconomically-efficient plan for addressing government payments isin place and capable <strong>of</strong> preserving fiscal stability while the politicalbranches work out a longer-term compromise.In my view, payment rules derived solely from obscure ReconstructionEra constitutional provisions or controversial theories <strong>of</strong> inherentauthority are unlikely to have the desired effect. Rather a sensiblesystem <strong>of</strong> prioritization – likely built <strong>of</strong>f <strong>of</strong> a FIFO paymentplan adjusted to honor debt service payments under the Public <strong>Debt</strong>Clause as well as Social Security and perhaps other trust fund paymentsunder 42 U.S.C. § 1320B–15 – is the most attractive path.To the extent that the prioritization decisions are supported throughinvocation <strong>of</strong> the Impoundment Act’s rules <strong>of</strong> deferral and other potentiallyapplicable federal budget laws, so much the better. Whileone might wish that we lived in a country where Phase Two <strong>Debt</strong>Crises were impossible to imagine, we no longer inhabit that world.Thus, we have no choice but to plan for crisis in a manner that is asconsistent as possible with the rule <strong>of</strong> law, and to map out a course <strong>of</strong>governmental action that will minimize disruption and uncertainty.The dynamics <strong>of</strong> political brinksmanship may make it difficult forthe Executive to plan for a Phase Two <strong>Debt</strong> Crisis in the public view,but the academic community and independent analysts are under

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