THE RUDOLF REPORT

GERMAR RUDOLF · THE RUDOLF REPORTThe Bull in the China ShopIn March, 1993, with a furious publicity campaign, Remer announcedas a measure of self-defense that he was going to publish anddistribute that piece of exculpatory evidence that he was not permittedto present to the court, because the Holocaust is assumed to be selfevident.546 Thereby Remer broke the first unconditional rule for theprotection of my doctoral title, namely that there be no accompanyingpublic propaganda. Thinking that this writing would only circulate inRemer’s circle of supporters, I paid little attention. When I received aphone call from a journalist of a west German radio station, informingme that some of those advertising sheets had surfaced at the Universityof Cologne, the situation changed. Soon the management of the FreseniusInstitute was on the telephone asking me what was in the report—theFresenius Institute had analyzed the masonry samples fromAuschwitz for me. They hinted that they might consider joining me intaking legal action against Remer. An hour later the Institute’s attorneywas threatening me with legal action. Remer had become a bull in thechina shop.Between a Rock and a RockMy situation was precarious. At the request of an attorney, I hadprepared an expert opinion to be used in the defense of his client. Theconclusion of the report was potentially capable of reducing the culpabilityof said client with respect to the criminality of some of his factualassertions. I intended to publish the report a few months aftercompleting my doctoral work anyway. Now the client took the step ofpublishing the report at a time that was uncomfortably early and, whatwas worse and unexpected, with an unhealthy press campaign. ShouldI now take him to court after having helped him in court? Should I takehim to court for doing what I intended to do myself in a few months,though with a smaller or different press campaign? 547 After all, I had546 Chapter 244 of the German Criminal Code provides that the court may reject evidence on thegrounds of ‘common knowledge’ or complete unsuitability. This happens mostly in ‘Holocaust’cases, and, indeed, without examination of the submitted evidence, to determinewhether it is actually unsuitable or whether it may be able to defeat ‘common knowledge’,which it might do if it were superior to evidence previously submitted. In trials against revisionistsand also against supposed ‘National Socialist criminals,’ exculpatory evidence is defacto verboten, a classic indication of a show trial.547 My hesitation in taking legal measures against Remer was later used by the court as an indica-320