THE RUDOLF REPORT

GERMAR RUDOLF · THE RUDOLF REPORTCourts for the sake of relieving the workload of the court, shows howlittle room for maneuver is left to him who gets caught up in thewheels of justice.The Arbitrary Evaluation of EvidenceEven if a court has introduced evidence in the course of a trial thatmade its delicately constructed bridge of circumstantial evidence tocollapse by refuting it, this is no reason not to impose a sentence. Hereis an example.In my case, the court had come up with the idea that, already inOctober 1992, I had planned Remer’s distribution activities of his versionand the subsequent publication of my authorized version as onesingle operation planned in advance (decision pp. 207ff.).At the same time, on Feb. 16, 1995, the court introduced a letter ofmine to Mark Weber, dated May 22, 1993, from which it was clear thatup to the end of May 1993, a month after the end of Remer’s distributionoperation, I still did not know where I could publish my authorized versionof the expert report, which indisputably contradicted the court’sthesis that I was already planning to publish the authorized version at thesame time as I was allegedly helping to plan the Remer operation.Here is a discussion of a second example of the court’s logic-freeevaluation of the evidence. In its written verdict, the court concededthat I intended to get the attention of the lay public for my expert report(decision pp. 23f., 108f., 210), so that I had paid attention that therewas no reason for the general public to suspect any lack of technicalmerit and reputation, e.g., by including political comments (decisionpp. 17ff., 196f., 218). This was supported by the evidence as a wholeand in particular by the documents introduced on June 13, 1995, whichwas a series of letters that I wrote to various persons between 1991 and1993, all clearly stating that I did not want any political or polemiccomments included in or associated with my expert report. However, ifone was to follow this logic, one has to assume that I would have sentout—or agreed to the distribution of—a version of my expert reportwhich confined itself to technical discussion but would never have sentout one such as the Remer version with its polemical/political commentary.In the decision the court can escape this logical contradictiononly by claiming that I had miscalculated the effect of Remer’scommentary (p. 228).342