ARTICLES

ARTICLES
“NO WAITING FOR GEORGE”:
The Question of Support for the Black Watch
assault on Verrières Ridge in Operation
SPRING, Normandy, 25 July 1944
David R. O’Keefe, MA, PhD
The Canadian attack on Verrières Ridge during the morning
of 25 July 1944 ranks as the second-costliest single-day
engagement for the Canadian Army in the Second World War,
exceeded only by the disaster at Dieppe. In less than 24 hours,
a force of two infantry and two armoured divisions under the
command of Lt-Gen Guy Simonds’s 2nd Canadian Corps
suffered more than 1,500 casualties in Operation SPRING,
leaving a legacy of recrimination and controversy. 1 Among the
casualties, the loss of 300 of the 320 riflemen of the Black
Watch remains a source of unending debate. One of many
contentious issues is the question of tank and artillery support
for the assault by the Black Watch on their objective in phase
II, the village of Fontenay-le-Marmion. 2 Sixty-five years later,
embittered survivors still state categorically that neither tank
nor artillery support materialized during their mid-morning
assault, and that the lack of support led directly to the failure
of the four-hour attack, in which they suffered 94% casualties.
Not surprisingly, veterans from both the 5th Field Artillery
Regiment and the First Hussars refute these claims to varying
degrees, and no historical account or military study has
remedied the finger-pointing or provided much-needed
understanding of the events of 25 July. For the most part, this
is due to the failure to examine the situation faced by the
Black Watch and their supporting arms within the overall
context of Operation SPRING. This examination not only
silences the lingering tempest in a teapot; it also transcends
the inquiry to provide insight into the questions of leadership,
decision-making, command and control, tank/infantry
cooperation and the Clausewitzian “friction” and “fog of war”
in this brutal chapter of Canadian military history. 3
Designed by Simonds under the auspices of General Miles
Dempsey’s Second British Army, SPRING reflected the
Canadian Corps commander’s gunner training and his highly
centralized command style. The plan was both complicated
and complex, relying on strict timings and even stricter
control for success. 4 Simonds’s plan, originally conceived on
the morning of 20 July, envisioned a four-phase operation to
© MR. DAVID R. O’KEEFE, ‘“NO WAITING FOR GEORGE”: THE QUESTION OF SUPPORT FOR THE BLACK WATCH ASSAULT
ON VERRIÈRES RIDGE IN OPERATION SPRING, NORMANDY, 25 JULY 1944’, CANADIAN ARMY JOURNAL VOL. 16.2
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