ARTICLES

The infantry corps currently has 5,238 person years (PYs, another term for positions) of all
ranks and trades to fill its six mechanized and three light infantry battalions. Moving to
six MIBs and three IBs as proposed here would require 6,390 PYs. Obviously the 1,100+ PY
shortfall, along with the lack of available existing and proposed platforms, means this proposal
is not feasible.
Therefore, this article will propose force generation variants of the IB and MIB to allow these
organizations to be adopted with minimal cost and reorganization:
1. The Army shifts from an organization of six mechanized and three light infantry
battalions to one of three mechanized infantry and six infantry battalions.
2. The DFS platoon, requiring resources that are not available today, is zero filled at
this time.
3. The third rifle platoon in each rifle company/mechanized rifle company is zero filled
by Regular Force soldiers and is filled by reservists for training and operations.
The first proposal, reducing the number of MIBs in the army, is based on the resources available
to the corps. The infantry cannot afford to continue maintaining the current nine-battalion
mix with its lack of required organic capabilities and its never-filled positions. The proposed
mix of three MIBs and six IBs is similar to the ratios in our allies’ armies, indicating that a high
degree of mechanization is not sustainable. 21 The impact on the current iteration of the MRP
will be minimal and the Army will still be capable of performing its assigned tasks. The LOO 3
mechanized battle group can be covered off by the CMBG’s MIB while LOO 4 and the joint
force elements (NEO Vanguard Company, Joint Force Protection Companies) can be covered
by the two IBs.
The second proposal is quite straightforward. The DFS platoon capability, which remains
essential and must be incorporated in updated doctrine, should be proposed as a required
capability, with PY growth and new systems, to the Army as part of the FD process. Until then,
it is a bridge too far and cannot be filled within the current resource and manpower envelope.
The final proposal is merely a formalization of the affiliations that the Force 2013 infantry
concept sought to establish. If all reserve augmentation is concentrated into three rifle platoons,
the reservists’ absence during much of the battalion’s annual training is mitigated in a less
disruptive fashion than with the current format, which leaves holes in every organization down
to the rifle section. Regular Force rifle companies and mechanized rifle companies, possessing
two of three rifle platoons and their weapons/IFV platoons to provide manoeuvre support,
would still be capable of conducting meaningful training in garrison. Baseline infantry
positions in these third rifle platoons are filled by reservists (minimizing the experience delta)
while specialist positions, such as vehicle crewing or manning a mortar, are filled by Regular
Force soldiers with the time to maintain proficiency, meaning that a reserve rifle platoon can
integrate into a mechanized rifle company with no organizational changes (proper marry-up
drills help familiarize reservists with the vehicle).
80 THE CANADIAN ARMY JOURNAL VOLUME 16.2 2016