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Meanwhile, Hutton’s departure and his “valedictory” speeches caused much less public outcry
than Laurier had feared, as the war had tarnished British military reputations and Hutton’s
various other quarrels had by this stage cost him a large measure of his popularity. Hutton’s
words did, however, ensure that the Laurier government gave official and public voice to its
own grievances after he had departed. 168 Laurier told the House that the GOC had been recalled
for being consistently “insubordinate and indiscreet, and [having] deliberately ignored the
authority of the minister.” 169 For his part, Borden reflected that “since the time of Alexander I
doubt if a more ambitious and unscrupulous warrior ever lived. He was always playing to the
galleries, always thinking about the possible effect of any move upon his own name and fame.
It was Hutton first and the devil take whoever came afterwards.” 170 The trauma had cut both
ways. It was not by coincidence that, after Hutton’s departure, the Canadian Militia Act was
soon revised to allow for command of the Militia to go to a Canadian. None were appointed,
however, as shortly afterwards the position of GOC was replaced with a Militia Council
under which the powers of the Minister were made clearer and many command
ambiguities removed. 171
So what can be said of Canada’s path to war, Hutton’s role within it, and the wider issue of
imperial defence? It is clear that, following the disappointment of the Colonial Conference of
1897, where Chamberlain had tried unsuccessfully to interest the self-governing colonies in
cooperative defence arrangements, he nonetheless continued to hope for and work towards a
closer unity across the “white” empire. That imperative continued throughout Hutton’s tenure
in Canada and, for the Colonial Secretary, the worsening situation in South Africa seemed to
offer an opportunity. 172 Following the breakdown of the Bloemfontein Conference on
9 June 1899, for example, Chamberlain drafted (but never sent) a note to Minto suggesting that,
in the event of war, “the colonies should join with the mother country in a show of imperial
loyalty.” 173 Three weeks later, he renewed the suggestion in a secret communication explaining
that he felt the mounting crisis was an “opportunity of showing the solidarity of the Empire.” 174
When Chamberlain asked Minto if an offer of troops was “probable,” he noted: “I do not desire
that it should be the result of external pressure or suggestion,” as that would defeat the purpose
of creating an appearance of imperial unity with which to help coerce the Boers. 175 The object
here was not to build any form of imperial defence arrangement per se. The point was not to
secure the services of colonial troops, but rather to garner official colonial support. The small
numbers suggested by Wolseley for the initial contingents—sufficient to achieve symbolic value
and small enough not to cost too much—were further evidence of that.
Yet there never was any secret accord between the three men. They certainly shared a wish to
see Canadians in South Africa, but in that they were hardly alone. Hutton’s attempts to explain
and justify his actions to Chamberlain in October would hardly have been necessary if he was
simply following instructions. 176 The closest Hutton ever came to conspiracy was telling
Wolseley in August of the plan he had developed on Minto’s suggestion for such a contingent,
should it be approved by the Canadian government. 177 He received nothing in reply. It should
be noted that that “secret” plan, initially drafted without Borden’s knowledge, certainly had his
blessing from September. Hutton is far less “guilty” here than many of his fellow commandants,
such as George Arthur French (in New South Wales) and Joseph Maria Gordon (in South
46 THE CANADIAN ARMY JOURNAL VOLUME 16.2 2016