ARTICLES

gathered together to go to South Africa. Hutton replied “not a few but 5,000 men without any
difficulty,” an idea Scott rejected, claiming Hutton “did not know the feeling of the Country.” 47
Hutton countered, arguing that, in the event of war, public opinion would force the government’s
hand. Scott was furious. It was a meeting that would return to haunt Hutton, as his
inferred knowledge of the upcoming war, and Canada’s place within it, undermined his efforts
to appear uninvolved. 48 Two days later, Hutton departed again, this time on an extended tour
of the western provinces and prairie towns, more convinced than ever that the crisis in
South Africa was close to breaking point and that the surge of public opinion would follow. 49
Hutton certainly was involved, despite his careful efforts to absent himself from Ottawa. His
vociferous public speaking, which helped to turn government attitudes against him from
mid-1899, was to some degree designed, in his words, “to raise military enthusiasm and active
patriotism” to a “white hot” level—just as Laurier sought to cool it. 50 Few direct references to
South Africa were made, but the looming war, particularly from August on, was the clear
context. The French-Canadian press accused him in early September of deliberately arousing
public feelings to “influence the policy of the Government.” 51 Hutton was also involved at a
practical level. He told Borden of the plan he had developed at Minto’s suggestion in
September. 52 Borden was not displeased. 53 Without publicity, the minister immediately
instructed Hutton to “place the Canadian forces in a state of readiness, pending a call to arms.” 54
The bombshell dropped in Canada with Chamberlain’s fateful, circular 3 October message to
Minto and the Australasian governors. It read: “Secretary of State for War and Commanderin-Chief
desire that you express high appreciation of signal exhibition of patriotic feeling of
people of Canada shown by offers to serve in South Africa.” 55 Borden’s deputy minister,
Louis-Félix Pinault, made an unauthorized press release of the contents of the cable but, even
had he not, it would soon have been public news as the message was published, more or less,
in the British press soon after the event. 56 The Australians were surprised by the message, whose
immediate effect was to end the continuing commandants’ conference and any chance of a
federal contingent. 57 All six Australian colonies then got on with planning their contingents in
accordance with London’s request. 58 Laurier’s government was somewhat more perplexed,
however, given no official offer of any type had yet been made. The wording of the cable to the
Canadians may well have been the result of confusion between the War Office and the Colonial
Office, or else it might have been taken to refer to the individual or non‐government offers of
service already received from various Canadians. 59 Certainly, Chamberlain was well-aware that
there was still no official offer from Laurier’s government. 60
Surprise in Ottawa soon gave way to suspicion, and then fury, largely due to the fact that, on
the same day Chamberlain’s cable was received, the Canadian Military Gazette published the
Borden-Hutton plan for a contingent. Moreover, the Gazette claimed: “If war should be
commenced in the Transvaal ... the offer of a force from the Canadian militia for service will
be made by the Canadian Government.” 61 Readers were left to conclude the decision must
already have been made. The coincidence seemed more than suspicious; it smelled like a
conspiracy to force the government’s hands. This was doubly so in that special efforts had been
made to publicize this article, with advance proofs sent to various newspapers, which published
the story simultaneous with the Gazette.
36 THE CANADIAN ARMY JOURNAL VOLUME 16.2 2016