ARTICLES

ARTICLES
ORGANIZING CANADA’S INFANTRY
Major Cole Petersen, CD
With the end of Canada’s 12‐year mission in Afghanistan, the infantry has again proven its role
as the foundation on which the Canadian Armed Forces builds ground combat power. Throughout
the mission, the infantry was able to adapt to and overcome challenges in numerous
different settings, from framework security patrolling, to mentoring and training Afghan
security forces, to combat operations against insurgents. In all such instances, the infantry
met the challenge and proved that Canada still produces some of the best infantry soldiers in
the world.
Despite this, the Infantry Corps seems to be entering another crisis of identity—not necessarily
a new crisis, but rather one that has continued to various degrees since the late 1990s with
the introduction of the LAV III and the creation of the light battalions. In recent times, the
question of how to organize the infantry unfolded with Force 2013, which introduced new
equipment in the Close Combat Vehicle (CCV) and the Tactical Armoured Patrol Vehicle
(TAPV) and created four variants of companies intermixed within the nine existing battalions.
Establishment shortfalls resulted in vacant positions down to the section level to be filled by
reservists, and what was produced was the Force 2013 interim infantry battalion. Today’s
battalions are based on this Force 2013 model but, with vehicle projects cancelled or
significantly delayed, renewed discussions of battalion symmetry have recently arisen. All the
while, current practice and policy and extant doctrine have drifted apart, with battalion and
company manuals decades out of date and, in some cases, still labelled “interim.”
The lack of current, relevant and overarching doctrine and the mercurial nature of Army and
corps organizational proposals have led to an incoherent situation for today’s infantry. At the
coal face, infantry battalions continue to train world-class ground fighters, but after Force 2013’s
organizations failed to develop due to the cancellation of equipment programs, there has been
trepidation and uncertainty within the units over what tomorrow’s roles and tasks will be. This
is in direct contrast to our allies, who over the past few years have all been able to carry out
thorough appreciations of the role of the infantry within their armies, definitively frame
organizational tasks and principles for their battalions and publish capstone documents and
execute the plan, all while in contact with the enemy. 1
This article will analyze how and why we organize the infantry. In light of Force 2016, the
Army’s next organizational review, this article will review the current Force 2013 interim
infantry battalion and propose recommendations for a better battalion organization for force
generation and force employment purposes, while still addressing the very real resource
constraints that face the Army today.
TODAY’S INFANTRY AND TODAY’S REQUIREMENTS
The foundations for the Canadian Army’s current infantry doctrine and organizations are
varied and scattered. The aging B-GL-309-001, The Infantry Battalion in Battle (published in
1995), until replaced, is the official published source for battalion organization and
employment, but the manual is problematic in that it describes only mechanized battalions
© MAJOR COLE PETERSEN, ‘ORGANIZING CANADA’S INFANTRY’, CANADIAN ARMY JOURNAL VOL. 16.2
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